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ARTICLE 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause 
Maggie McKinley* 
Abstract. Contrary to popular opinion, the Supreme Court has not yet resolved whether 
lobbying is constitutionally protected. Belying this fact, courts, Congress, and scholars 
mistakenly assume that lobbying is protected under the Petition Clause. Because scholars 
have shared the mistaken assumption that the Petition Clause protects the practice of 
“lobbying,” no research to date has looked closely at the Petition Clause doctrine and the 
history of petitioning in relation to lobbying. In a recent opinion addressing petitioning in 
another context, the Supreme Court unearthed the long history behind the right to 
petition and argued for the importance of this history for future interpretation of the 
Petition Clause. 
Following the Supreme Court’s direction, this Article examines the implications of the 
history of petitioning for lobbying and, drawing from recent empirical research on 
lobbying, argues that the way Congress engages with the public through our current 
lobbying system actually violates the right to petition. At the Founding, and for much of 
this Nation’s history, the right to petition protected a formal, transparent platform for 
individual—and, in particular, minority—voices to participate in the lawmaking process. 
Without regard to the number of signers or the political power of the petitioner, petitions 
received equal process and consideration. This platform allowed both the enfranchised and 
unenfranchised to gain access to lawmakers on equal footing. Women, African Americans, 
and Native Americans all engaged in petitioning activity, and Congress attended to each 
equally. 
Moving beyond ahistorical, decontextualized interpretations of the Petition Clause, this 
Article posits that our current lobbying system—wherein access and procedure are   
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informal, opaque, and based on political power—actually violates the right to petition, 
which provided access and formal procedure without respect to the political power of the 
petitioner. The history of petitioning teaches that affording access to the lawmaking 
process on the basis of an individual’s political power makes as little sense as affording 
access to courts on such a basis. 
This history suggests the need for revisiting the Petition Clause doctrine. On the one hand, 
it argues for a stronger petition right, especially a right to consideration and response. On 
the other hand, it suggests a narrowed petition right that protects only practices that 
correspond with the traditional practice of petitioning. Fundamentally, this Article 
demonstrates that a contextualized understanding of the Petition Clause, grounded in an 
accurate historical frame, requires comprehensive reform of our lobbying system and a 
formalization of the petition process in order to preserve our republican form of 
government. 
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Introduction 
Imagine that when you filed a complaint in a court, the judge first 
reviewed the document to count the number of signatures or to determine 
whether any of the signers had contributed to the judge’s campaign. If the judge 
identified enough signatures or identified the signature of a contributor, the 
judge might accept your filing; otherwise, she might refuse to accept the 
complaint and decline to hear the case entirely. Even if she allowed the case to 
proceed, the judge might hold the proceedings in secret, meeting informally 
with parties and individuals unrelated to your action, and refuse to make 
public any of the filings in the action. If the judge held a close relationship with 
a powerful individual interested in the case, she might allow that third party to 
send her instructions by text message that would guide her questions and 
actions during trial. The judge might also afford you entirely different process 
than other litigants: if she thought that you were politically powerful, she 
might provide you comprehensive hearings and a trial. Otherwise, she might 
allow you a five-minute phone conference without ever reading your 
submissions. She might also provide you no process at all, abandoning your 
complaint to a wastepaper basket. There is little doubt that this scenario would 
offend deeply our notions of the right to due process in the context of courts 
because we believe that the right means equal, formal, and public process. That 
we accept less when we, as members of the public, engage with Congress 
appears more historical accident than anything grounded in reason. 
Congress’s engagement with the public outside of the vote inevitably 
presents challenging regulatory and constitutional questions. On the one hand, 
lawmakers have a strong need to gather information about the public to 
facilitate the lawmaking process, and the public is often the only source. The 
Constitution also protects explicitly “the right . . . to petition,” or the right to 
engage directly with government, “for a redress of grievances.”1 On the other 
hand, our informal and largely unregulated lobbying system is prone to abuse, 
risks disruption and distortion of our lawmaking process, and has contributed 
to an alarming loss of public faith in Congress.2 The minimal scholarly debate 
to engage with the puzzle of lobbying conflates lobbying and petitioning and 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. The low approval rating and steep decline in confidence in Congress has been well 
documented. See, e.g., Is Congress for Sale?, RASMUSSEN REP. (1July 9, 2015), 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/archive/mood_of_america_archive 
/congressional_performance/is_congress_for_sale (reporting survey results that only 
13% of respondents approved of Congress, with 56% responding that Congress does its 
job “poorly” and 59% responding that most members are willing to sell their  
votes); Rebecca Riffkin, Public Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits Historic Low, GALLUP 
(1June 19, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171710/public-faith-congress-falls-again 
-hits-historic-low.aspx (reporting survey results of only 7% of respondents having a 
“great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in Congress, down from 42% in 1973—the first 
year of the survey).  
 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause 
68 STAN L. REV. 1131 (2016) 
1134 
assumes away the question whether the First Amendment protects our current 
lobbying system.3 Likely because of this assumption, few scholars have 
considered whether lobbying and petitioning are coextensive and, if not, how 
Congress ought to engage with the public in order to comport with the 
petition right. The literature instead focuses narrowly on whether our current 
lobbying system should or could be regulated4—or potentially even 
subsidized5—in accordance with the Constitution. Little scholarly work has 
been done to examine the contours of the right to petition in the context of our 
current lobbying system and to answer the question of how a legislature of 
republican design ought to engage with the public during the lawmaking 
process, if at all.6 Despite presenting important questions regarding the 
institutional design of our legislatures, the little attention these questions have 
received by legal scholars and the courts has fostered only deeper confusion. 
To resolve decades of confusion in a single article is a chimera. Rather, this 
Article aims to reshape the dialogue regarding public engagement with 
 
 3. One telling example arises from the introductory article to the Stanford Law & Policy 
Review’s special edition on lobbying. Alan B. Morrison, Introduction1: Lobbyists—Saints or 
Sinners?, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2008). Alan Morrison opens his introduction to the 
edition asking whether lobbyists are “saints” or “sinners.” Id. at 1 (capitalization 
altered). He then quickly concludes that “the answer does not really matter . . . because, 
as all the authors recognize, the right to lobby is the right to petition the government 
for redress of grievances, which is explicitly protected by the First Amendment.” Id. 
(making this statement without citation); see also Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of 
Influence1: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 160, 163 (2014); Richard 
L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 196 (2012); 
Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups1: Toward a Constitutional Right 
to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 172 (1993). For a very recent and very rare 
exception, see Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 4, 6 
(2014), which notes that the scope of the lobbying right is “unclear.” 
 4. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 3, at 197. 
 5. Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying1: Lobbying, 
Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 89-90 (2014); 
Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, Remarks 
at the Georgia State University Law Review Symposium (Nov. 12, 2010), in 27 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1155, 1167-68 (2011). 
 6. Notably, the terms “petition” and “lobbying” are not listed in the tables of contents or 
indices of most First Amendment casebooks. See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION AND CONSCIENCE (2003); 
JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER (1992); 
ARTHUR D. HELLMAN ET AL., FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION (3d ed. 2014); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: CASES AND THEORY (2008); ARNOLD H. LOEWY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (1999); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS (6th ed. 2015); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH 
FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW (5th ed. 2013); EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS (4th 
ed. 2011); RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008).  
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Congress. First, this Article seeks to unsettle the presumption that the Supreme 
Court has resolved definitively that lobbying is protected by the First 
Amendment. Second, this Article aims to clarify the reach and meaning of the 
Petition Clause by charting the little-known history of the petition process and 
the history of lobbying and by addressing the Petition Clause doctrine 
comprehensively for the first time. Finally, the Article puts forth the 
heterodox argument that our current lobbying system7 actually violates the 
right to petition. 
Although the Supreme Court often alludes in dicta to presumed 
constitutional limitations on Congress’s ability to regulate our current 
lobbying system,8 the Court has yet to resolve the issue. The two cases 
generally cited for the principle that lobbying is protected under the Petition 
Clause9 fail to support that claim. In the most often cited case, United States v. 
Harriss, the Court actually declined explicitly to reach the issue whether the 
statute’s penalty of a three-year lobbying ban violated the Petition Clause.10 
The Court’s first in-depth discussion of lobbying and the Petition Clause, Noerr 
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, interpreted lobbying activity as an exception 
 
 7. A definitional clarification is in order. Much of our discourse around “lobbying” fails to 
distinguish between the private conduct of the individuals we call “lobbyists” and the 
state action of Congress in providing access to the lawmaking process to those 
individual lobbyists and others in order to “lobby.” It is the latter that is the focus of 
this Article. Lobbyists, as individuals, can engage in a range of activities, including 
running for office, contributing to electoral campaigns, and publishing op-eds, but 
these individuals become lobbyists only by “lobbying,” or by engaging directly with 
government, usually Congress. Engaging directly with Congress implicates more than 
simply private conduct; it necessarily implies some form of reception or, at the very 
least, acquiescence or acknowledgement from the other side. For example, a lobbyist 
cannot engage in paradigmatic lobbying behavior—that is, a meeting with a member of 
Congress—without the member affording the lobbyist access and process. This Article 
takes the approach that this system of direct engagement with Congress—because it 
implicates state action and raises distinct constitutional and regulatory concerns—
should be treated separately and refers to this system separately as our “lobbying 
system.” 
 8. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“And the Court has upheld 
registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power 
to ban lobbying itself.” (emphasis added)). In United States v. Harriss, the Court upheld 
disclosure requirements under an earlier version of the compelled-speech doctrine but 
declined explicitly to reach the question whether the statute’s three-year lobbying ban 
penalty violated the Petition Clause. 347 U.S. 612, 625-27 (1954). 
 9. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961); 
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626-27. 
 10. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 627. The Court also mentioned the Petition Clause in its survey 
application of the First Amendment to a mandatory disclosure requirement, but its 
analysis of the requirement resembled more closely its doctrine on compelled speech—
the doctrine the Court applies today in the context of disclosure regimes. See, e.g., Doe 
v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194-95 (2010) (analyzing under the compelled-speech doctrine a 
state statute compelling public disclosure of the names and addresses of petition 
signers). 
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to the Sherman Act in order to shield it from allegations of anticompetitive 
conduct, citing Petition Clause concerns in part.11 As later cases have 
highlighted, however, it is unclear whether the Court rested the Noerr-
Pennington lobbying exception on the Petition Clause or on simple statutory 
interpretation and the legislative history of the Act.12 The majority of case law 
interpreting the Petition Clause focuses not on lobbying or even legislative 
petitioning but on access to courts and formal agency proceedings.13 Belying 
the nearly ubiquitous consensus that any and all forms of lobbying activity are 
coextensive to petitioning and, therefore, are protected under the Petition 
Clause, the constitutional protections for our current lobbying system remain 
a very open question. 
Looking to the historical record to clarify the reach and meaning of the 
Petition Clause reveals that our lobbying system and the system protected by 
the petition right are wholly distinct. At the Founding, and for much of this 
Nation’s history, the right protected a form of access to Congress that more 
closely resembled the formal process afforded in courts than the informal tool 
of mass politics that lobbying and petitioning have become today.14 Individuals 
submitted over six hundred petitions to the first Congress—each a formal 
document that included a statement of grievance and a signatory list—which 
members of Congress read aloud on the floor, referred to a committee or 
another branch for consideration, and afforded a formal response.15 Women, 
African Americans, and Native Americans had all engaged with colonial and 
 
 11. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38. 
 12. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2502-03 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. The most well-known contemporary example is the Obama Administration’s “We the 
People” website that allows the public to “petition” the executive. WE THE PEOPLE, 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov (last visited May 5, 2016). The Obama Administration 
describes the “We the People” petition website as a supplement to, not a displacement 
of, the “current official methods of communication” with the executive. Terms of 
Participation, WE THE PEOPLE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/how-why/terms 
-participation (last visited May 5, 2016). As of January 2013, the Obama Administration 
promises that petitions are made available to the public in a searchable database if the 
petition garners 150 signatures in thirty days and promises an official response to 
petitions that garner more than 100,000 signatures in thirty days. Id. The  
website initially required only 5000 signatures in thirty days, but increasing use of  
the website motivated the Obama Administration to increase the threshold for 
response to 25,000 signatures and then 100,000. Macon Phillips, Why We’re Raising  
the Signature Threshold for We the People, WHITE HOUSE (1Jan. 15, 2013, 6:00 PM  
ET), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/01/15/why-we-re-raising-signature 
-threshold-we-people. An examination of the historical petition right could call into 
question the constitutionality of this novel model of petitioning the executive. See infra 
Part III.A.  
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
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state governments through the petition process as a matter of course,16 and 
these unenfranchised and politically powerless communities transitioned 
smoothly to petitioning Congress after the Founding.17 Members did not 
afford more process or consideration to petitions with more signatures and did 
not require a minimum level of electoral power, or signature count, in order to 
provide formal process to a petition.18 Much like a complaint filed with a 
court, Congress treated each petition on equal footing—no matter the petition’s 
source and without regard to the political power of the petitioner19—and 
consideration was a public, transparent process.20 
By contrast, the lobbying market functioned (and still functions) as the 
antithesis of the formal petition process. Historically, the lobbying market 
auctioned informal access to lawmakers—access acquired through bribes, 
personal connections, threats, and electoral pressure.21 Lobbyists cultivated 
relationships with members of Congress in order to offer their clients more 
access and more comprehensive process than those individuals who engaged in 
the formal petition process.22 Professional lobbyists might themselves engage 
in petitioning, and petitioners might, on occasion, employ lobbyists to 
represent them in the formal petition process.23 The lobbying industry, 
however, was largely distinct from the formal petition process and inspired 
incredible public resentment at the fact that lobbyists circumvented and 
undermined the legitimate system of public engagement—namely, 
petitioning.24 State governments criminalized lobbying, and courts were quick 
to void contracts for lobbying services as violative of public policy because 
they saw the sale of one’s own personal, informal access as a corruption of 
petitioning.25 In most cases, the courts were clear that engaging in the formal 
petition process or hiring a representative to engage in the formal petition 
 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power1: Gentility and Lobbying in the 
Early Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 57, 57-99 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon 
eds., 2002) [hereinafter HOUSE AND SENATE] (surveying petitions submitted to Congress 
during the 1790s and noting the advantages gentility afforded to individuals seeking to 
influence the early Congress). 
 22. Id. at 58-62. 
 23. Id. at 60-65.  
 24. Id. at 60-61. 
 25. Teachout, supra note 3, at 7. 
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process on your behalf would not raise the same concerns;26 such contracts 
might even obtain constitutional protection.27 It was only in contracting for 
“lobbying” services—specifically, the sale of a lobbyist’s ability to circumvent 
the formal petition process—that public policy was offended.28 
The historical process of petitioning bears little resemblance to the way 
that Congress engages with the public today. Today, Congress affords 
individuals access to lawmakers and the lawmaking process only on an 
informal basis and provides preferential access, consideration, and procedure to 
the politically powerful.29 Gone is the public process whereby petitions were 
read into the congressional record, and in its place is a process closed to public 
scrutiny,30 with little to no public record outside of the compelled self-
disclosure reports mandated by the Lobbying Disclosure Act.31 In essence, our 
legitimate petitioning right has been supplanted by the illegitimate lobbying 
system that was seen as undermining the right to petition. We have 
increasingly taken this substitution for granted.32 But the history of 
 
 26. See, e.g., Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 449-50 (1874) (voiding a lobbying 
contingency fee contract as against public policy and distinguishing the lobbying 
contract from a contract for “purely professional services” such as “drafting [a]  
petition . . . attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, [and] preparing 
arguments . . . to a committee or other proper authority”). 
 27. See, e.g., Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 334-36 (1853) (holding 
contracts “to use personal or any secret or sinister influence on legislators” or 
contingency fee contracts as void against public policy but noting that all affected have 
an “undoubted right” to urge their claims before legislative committees so long as it is 
done honestly, openly, and candidly). 
 28. Trist, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 448-50. 
 29. See infra Part IV.A. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (2014). The disclosure regime of the Lobbying Disclosure Act has also 
been widely criticized as ineffective and out of date. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON FED. 
LOBBYING LAWS, AM. BAR ASS’N, LOBBYING LAW IN THE SPOTLIGHT: CHALLENGES AND 
PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS, at vii (2011).  
 32. A recent example occurred in a challenge to the Obama Administration’s policy of 
banning lobbyists from serving on certain advisory commissions. See Autor v. 
Pritzker, 740 F.3d 176, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The administration had campaigned on 
an antilobbyist platform and, after taking office, implemented a number of restrictions 
on lobbyist engagement with the executive, including the advisory commission ban. 
Bob Bauer, Assessing Lobbying Reform in the Obama Administration, Presentation to 
the American University Conference on Lobbying Reform in the U.S. and the E.U. 
(Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.american.edu/spa/ccps/upload/Bauer-remarks.pdf. A 
cohort of lobbyists challenged the ban as an unconstitutional condition on their 
petition rights. Autor, 740 F.3d at 177-78. During the litigation, the Obama 
Administration conceded that lobbying was protected by the Petition Clause, despite the 
fact that the Supreme Court has yet to wholly resolve the issue. Id. at 182 (“[T]he 
government acknowledges, as it must, that registered lobbyists are protected by the 
First Amendment right to petition.”); see also infra Part III.B. The administration 
subsequently declined to appeal the adverse ruling and instead withdrew the ban. 
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petitioning teaches that our procedural rights to engage with legislatures and 
our procedural due process rights in courts should not be so distinct. 
What little effort Congress has undertaken to regulate lobbying and the 
little doctrine that has developed around the Petition Clause have yet to 
recognize this history. Instead our regulatory frameworks and doctrine simply 
assume that lobbying and petitioning are coextensive and reflect the struggle 
to define the petition right against a background of changed circumstances. In 
the absence of any context to provide meaning to the Petition Clause, in 1985 
the Court eventually conflated the right to petition with the Free Speech 
Clause in McDonald v. Smith.33 However, the Supreme Court has recently 
indicated that it could be receptive to the history of petitioning when 
reinvigorating the Petition Clause. Following McDonald, scholars rushed to 
unearth the history of petitioning in order to criticize the Court’s conflation of 
the Petition and Free Speech Clauses and to argue for a distinctive Petition 
Clause doctrine grounded in that history.34 In 2011, the Supreme Court, citing 
the long-established importance of history in interpreting the First 
Amendment,35 relied on this newly unearthed history in the context of judicial 
and executive “petitioning” to establish a Petition Clause doctrine distinct from 
free speech.36 
Part I follows the Court’s lead in Guarnieri and provides a thick 
description37 of the Petition Clause in order to clarify our Petition Clause 
 
 33. 472 U.S. 479, 480 (1985). 
 34. See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution1: The History and Significance of the 
Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998) (excavating the history of petitioning 
and arguing for a distinctive Petition Clause doctrine); Eric Schnapper, “Libelous” 
Petitions for Redress of Grievances—Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 
303 (1989) (same); Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”1: An Analysis of 
the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153 (1986) (same); 
Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of 
Grievances1: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1993) (same); Stephen 
A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition the Government for Redress of 
Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986) (same). The burgeoning discourse of historical 
scholarship around the Petition Clause even fostered dissent. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & 
Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 740-41 (1999). 
 35. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2498 (2011) (“Some effort must be 
made to identify the historic and fundamental principles that led to the enumeration 
of the right to petition in the First Amendment, among other rights fundamental to 
liberty.”). 
 36. Id. at 2495 (“Courts should not presume there is always an essential equivalence in the 
two Clauses or that Speech Clause precedents necessarily and in every case resolve 
Petition Clause claims. Interpretation of the Petition Clause must be guided by the 
objectives and aspirations that underlie the right. A petition conveys the special 
concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests action by the 
government to address those concerns.” (citations omitted)). 
 37. Modeling the Supreme Court’s method of interpretation in Guarnieri, this Article 
draws upon historical sources as a means to contextualize or provide a “thick 
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doctrine with respect to legislative petitioning. In particular, Part I aims to 
contextualize the Petition Clause within the history of the text’s drafting, the 
history of petitioning, and the history of the distinct practice of lobbying.38 
 
description” in order to understand the meaning ascribed to these terms. This method 
relies heavily on the work of semiotician and anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who 
advocated a “thick description” or contextualization of a focus of inquiry in order to 
understand its meaning. Clifford Geertz, Thick Description1: Toward an Interpretative 
Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 3, 14 (1973). 
Legal historian Saul Cornell has commented that an historical application of Gricean 
pragmatics would resemble a Geertzian thick description and has remarked upon 
Geertz’s recent contribution to historical methodology. Saul Cornell, The People’s 
Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution1: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate 
over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 302 n.25 (2011).  
 38. We have, in our constitutional culture, become tribal. To point to text and history, at 
least for some, is to join ranks with the tribe of originalists and the ideology that 
imbues that tribe. Although I am quite supportive of tribalism in other contexts, I find 
this simplification of methodology problematic. Clearing the theoretical thicket 
around the differences between the use of text and history and the methodology called 
“originalism” is beyond the scope of this Article. I reserve this question for later work, 
where I might clear the thicket more precisely. But a point of clarification is in order 
here to avoid any distraction prompted by this methodological tribalism. 
Praising fidelity to constitutional text within historical context is an acceptable means 
of constitutional interpretation within a range of methodologies, including Dworkin’s 
moral reading. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity1: Originalism, Scalia, 
Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1251-52 (1997). In reaching a “moral 
reading,” Dworkin claims that we must first look to constitutional text to resolve the 
“best sense of the Framers speaking as they did in the context in which they spoke.” Id. 
at 1253. In particular, we must look to the meaning of the text at the time of the 
Framing in order to resolve whether the text involves a set meaning or an abstract 
principle. Id. It is only the latter that involves a moral reading. Id. (contrasting the 
abstract terms of “cruel” within the Eighth Amendment and “equal” within the 
Fourteenth Amendment against the constitutional requirement that the President 
meet or exceed the age of thirty-five). Constitutional text with a fixed meaning, 
according to Dworkin, is subject to a form of textualism even when applying the 
moral reading methodology. Id. at 1251-52. In describing his form of textualism, a 
method that he claimed to share with Justice Scalia and Laurence Tribe, Dworkin 
provides an example apropos of the Petition Clause. Id. at 1256-62. 
In describing his moral reading methodology, Dworkin points to history to resolve 
ambiguities in meaning for these nonabstract constitutional terms and, to illustrate, he 
describes a passage from Shakespeare’s Hamlet where Hamlet “said to his sometime 
friends, ‘I know a hawk from a handsaw.’” Id. at 1251 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
HAMLET act 2, sc. 2). But the question arises “whether Hamlet was using the word 
‘hawk’ that designates a kind of a bird, or the different word that designates a 
Renaissance tool.” Id. at 1251. To resolve this question, “[w]e must begin, in my view, by 
asking what—on the best evidence available—the authors of the text in question 
intended to say” and “[i]f we apply that standard to Hamlet, it’s plain that we must read 
his claim as referring not to a bird, which would make the claim an extremely silly 
one, but to a renaissance tool.” Id. at 1252. So it would appear that, in calling for textual 
fidelity to the term “petition” in the Petition Clause, I would likely have the spirits of 
both Dworkin and Scalia on my side.  
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This Part focuses on the little-known history of petitioning, a formal practice 
that once constituted a vital mechanism of the legislative process. 
In Part II, I present the regulatory and doctrinal muddle around lobbying 
and the Petition Clause doctrine as a prime case study in the problems that arise 
from textualist interpretive methods that fail to take account of context39—in 
this case, an early and highly criticized version of textualism developed by 
Hugo Black that interpreted the Petition Clause without reference to the 
history that would have provided a clarified and stable meaning to the text.40 
In particular, Part II advances the argument that interpreting constitutional 
text, in the absence of a contextualized understanding of petitioning and 
lobbying, resulted in an overbroad and inconsistent application of the Clause. 
Part III relies on the thick description of petitioning to argue for a partial 
revisitation of the Petition Clause doctrine. Part III first argues that the Court 
should narrow the right to petition and disambiguate “petitioning” from 
“lobbying.” Specifically, it posits that the petition right protects only direct 
engagement with government and that the right would not protect other 
forms of “lobbying,” including informal engagement with government or 
public-directed advocacy. Part III then argues that the Court should strengthen 
the right to petition to guarantee equal and open access to the legislature 
through a formal, public process and to guarantee consideration and response. 
Lastly, Part III provides two examples of implications for the Petition Clause 
doctrine. 
Part IV describes findings from recent political science studies that show 
that our current lobbying system does not afford equal, formal access to 
lawmakers. Rather, the data show that Congress affords access to the 
lawmaking process both on an informal basis and sorted by the political power 
 
 39. Although statutory and constitutional interpretation scholarship has taken a 
definitive pragmatic or contextualized turn in the last few decades, what constitutes 
“context” is an underdeveloped question in legal scholarship. See PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 1-13 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 
2011); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951-55 
(1995); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392-93 (2003); 
John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 165; Victoria F. Nourse, 
Elementary Statutory Interpretation1: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 1613, 1614-16 (2014); Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional 
Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1124-39 (2015). In an effort to begin to remedy this 
theoretical hole in interpretive scholarship, this Article draws from the fields of neo-
Gricean sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology which have, with the support of 
empirical study, systematically begun to model context in everyday language use. See, 
e.g., STEPHEN LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 22-23 (1983); Allessandro Duranti & Charles 
Goodwin, Rethinking Context1: An Introduction, in RETHINKING CONTEXT: LANGUAGE AS 
AN INTERACTIVE PHENOMENON 1, 1-32 (Allessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin eds., 
1992); Elinor Ochs, Introduction1: What Child Language Can Contribute to Pragmatics, in 
DEVELOPMENTAL PRAGMATICS 1, 1-17 (Elinor Ochs & Bambi B. Schieffelin eds., 1979). 
 40. See infra Part II.B. 
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of the petitioner. Based on these findings, Part IV explores the implications of a 
contextualized right to petition for our current lobbying system, concluding 
that our current lobbying system actually violates the right to petition. In 
particular, this Part argues that a contextualized understanding of petitioning, 
and the republican values it preserved, could move the debate around lobbying 
reform away from a fixation on registration and disclosure regimes that simply 
force transparency within the current taken-for-granted system and toward an 
affirmative vision of how Congress ought to engage with the public during the 
lawmaking process. 
I. Contextualizing the Petition Clause 
A. Contextualizing Petitioning 
In a strange sense, the year 2015 marked the eight hundredth anniversary 
of the American right to petition.41 Magna Charta,42 a document signed under 
duress by a reviled English king, might seem at first blush an odd document on 
which to build our history of American petitioning.43 But, for the colonists, the 
document formed a fundamental illustration of the rights and liberties they felt 
were foundational in their struggle against the British Crown.44 Benjamin 
Franklin noted the anniversary of Magna Charta for readers of his Poor 
Richard’s Almanack in 1749, to mark the day in remembrance of the 
document.45 During the Revolutionary era, Magna Charta took on new life as a 
model for the demands of independence as it had, by Thomas Paine’s 
estimation, demanded liberties for all men and had been “formed, not in the 
senate, but in the field; and insisted on by the people, not granted by the 
crown.”46 His revolutionary advocacy in Common Sense urged the colonists to 
draft a document of independent government that would “answer[] to what is 
called the Magna Charta of England.”47 
The colonists, an unenfranchised and politically powerless minority, 
justified the Revolution with and rooted an independent American 
sovereignty in the failure of the British Crown to comply with its procedural 
obligations within the petition process and to respond to the colonists’ 
 
 41. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER 
OF KING JOHN 466-67 (1914). 
 42. As is customary among early Americanist historians, I adopt the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century spelling of the document common at the Founding. 
 43. MCKECHNIE, supra note 41, at 466-67. 
 44. See id. 
 45. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK (1749). 
 46. THOMAS PAINE, The Forester’s Letter III (1776), reprinted in THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED 
WRITINGS 74, 81 (1955). 
 47. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 31-32 (1776). 
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petitions.48 The Revolutionary era’s Continental Congress petitioned49 King 
George III twice in an effort to avoid full independence from Britain and the 
war that would necessarily precede it.50 The first petition was “huddled” into 
Parliament “amongst a bundle of American papers, and there neglected.”51 
Despite the failure of the first attempt, the Continental Congress adopted the 
second petition, termed the “Olive Branch Petition,” on July 8, 1775 and 
enlisted Richard Penn, former governor of Pennsylvania, to deliver it to the 
King.52 But the King refused to receive the colonists’ olive branch, and they 
were told that because he would not formally receive the petition at his throne, 
he would provide no response.53 Following its list of grievances, the 
Declaration of Independence54 grounded the right to sovereignty and 
ultimately to war in the failure of the King to respond: 
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the 
most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by 
repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which 
may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.55 
Hardly mentioned at all during the Constitutional Convention, the document 
constituted an icon of American Revolutionary independence and an historical 
and moral authority in support of American protest. 
Paine was correct that the original document was an act of political 
protest. In May of 1215, around forty English barons overtook London in an 
act of rebellion against King John.56 The following month, the King sued for 
 
 48. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
133 (1997). 
 49. According to Pauline Maier, under English law, a petition was a form of “address” that 
asked something of the King. Petitions of right 
had a particularly important place in English practice. They gave subjects a way of seeking 
redress of wrongs done under the authority of the King, whom they could not sue in the 
regular courts. Petitions of right asked for the recognition of undoubted rights, not mercy, and 
were directed at the King as the font of justice. 
Id. at 94. 
 50. Id. at 55. 
 51. Id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS para. 
6 (U.S. 1775)). 
 52. Id. at 57. 
 53. Id. at 58. 
 54. Declarations, according to Maier, occupied a different function under English law than 
petitions. “A declaration was a particularly emphatic pronouncement or proclamation 
that was often explanatory: from the fourteenth century ‘declaration’ implied ‘making 
clear’ or ‘telling.’ . . . But the word ‘declaration’ also referred to a legal instrument, a 
written statement of claims served on the defendant at the commencement of a civil 
action.” Id. at 94. 
 55. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 4 (U.S. 1776). 
 56. MCKECHNIE, supra note 41, at 35. 
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peace and agreed to give audience to the barons and their demands and to 
provide a formal response.57 The document of demands presented by the 
barons and grudgingly signed by the King later became known as the Magna 
Charta, Latin for “the Great Charter.”58 But Paine’s description of the document 
as securing broad rights was historical fiction. In grudgingly fixing his seal to 
the charter, the King granted his barons—hardly the common man envisioned 
by Paine—future audience before the Crown to present petitions.59 Petitioners 
would present petitions, along with a statement of grievances, and would often 
offer to finance the government in exchange for granting the petition.60 Not 
surprisingly, as the financial needs of the Crown increased, so did the volume 
of petitions afforded an audience before the King.61 Some have speculated that 
exponential increase in petitioning led eventually to the institutionalization of 
Parliament, a term used during the period to denote a discussion and, 
especially, a formal discussion between the King and those given audience in 
his court.62 
In Parliament, petitioning often drove the legislative agenda, which 
included petitions for public and private matters without any mechanism to 
distinguish them.63 Gregory Mark has argued that it was because of the quasi-
judicial nature of petitions and the quasi-judicial role of Parliament that 
Parliament developed an obligation to consider all petitions equally and the 
public fostered a growing sense of the right to formal consideration of and a 
response to their petitions.64 The petitions also allowed Parliament to expand 
its power vis-à-vis the King.65 The King was dependent on Parliament and, as 
the barons had earlier done, Parliament conditioned the granting of money on 
the King first redressing the petitions submitted to him from Parliament.66 
Petitioning became an intrinsic part of English political life by the seventeenth 
century, the words “petition” and “bill” were used interchangeably in 
legislatures, and the petition process was regarded as part of the constitutional 
framework.67 Notably, petitioning also served as the primary means of 
political engagement for the unenfranchised and for collective political 
 
 57. Id. at 38. 
 58. Id.  
 59. See Mark, supra note 34, at 2165-66. 
 60. Spanbauer, supra note 34, at 22-23. 
 61. Id. at 23. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Mark, supra note 34, at 2166. 
 64. Id. at 2166-67. 
 65. Id. at 2167. 
 66. Id. 
 67. K. Smellie, Right of Petition, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98, 98 (Edwin 
R.A. Seligman ed., 1933). 
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activity, as petitioners formed associations and petitioned on behalf of the 
collectivity.68 
English colonists of North America brought with them the English 
practice of petitioning and began to expand and extend the practice to fit 
within their new political context.69 Colonial charters reaffirmed the colonists’ 
right to petition in over fifty provisions, and many colonial assemblies 
reaffirmed the right.70 When the Massachusetts General Court established the 
Body of Liberties in 1641, the first legal code developed by English settlers, it 
codified the right to petition and articulated its contours in very inclusive 
terms: 
Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free shall have libertie to 
come to any publique Court, Councell, or Towne meeting, and either by speech or 
writing to move any lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to present any 
necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information, whereof that meeting 
hath proper cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due order, and 
respective manner.71 
Colonists exercising these broad petition rights petitioned on a broad range of 
matters, spanning from matters of general applicability in the “public interest” 
to very individual grievances, including many disputes that did not fit in 
neatly to an existing judicial cause of action.72 The petition process also began 
to manifest some of the dynamics of modern day interest group politics.73 
Petitions often addressed the economic needs of different associations, and 
colonial governments used the petition process, including the review of 
counterpetitions from competing groups, to negotiate between competing 
economic interests within their developing economies.74 
In addition to associational activity, the petition process also catered to the 
needs of individuals and political minorities.75 Like the Massachusetts Body of 
Liberties, many colonial governments either explicitly or implicitly opened 
the petition process to the unenfranchised and disenfranchised, and these 
 
 68. See, e.g., Mark, supra note 34, at 2169-70. 
 69. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 25 
(1986). 
 70. See Mark, supra note 34, at 2175 n.90. 
 71. A Coppie of the Liberties of the Massachusetts Collonie in New England, in 1 DOCUMENTS ON 
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION 122, 124 (Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr. ed., 1963). 
 72. See Higginson, supra note 34, at 145. 
 73. See id. at 150-51. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 44 (1979). 
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groups took full advantage of the process.76 Prisoners petitioned in quasi-
habeas terms to alter judgments, but they also petitioned to alter sentences and 
for broader criminal justice reform.77 Women petitioned to redress private 
grievances and joined men in petitioning on matters of broader public 
concern.78 While less common, colonial governments also saw petitions from 
slaves and free African Americans. 
In one poignant example, the Virginia legislature heard, considered, and 
granted a petition by “[a] group of mulattoes and free blacks” to exempt their 
wives and daughters from a tax imposed on black women and not white 
women.79 In 1769, the Colony of Virginia collected a “head tax,” or a flat tax, 
from all residents.80 The tax applied to all men, both white and black.81 But the 
tax applied only to black women, meaning that white women did not have to 
pay the tax.82 A group of mixed-race and free blacks took issue with the tax on 
black women and decided to exercise their right to petition.83 As surprising as 
it may sound to our modern ears, the Virginia Assembly treated the petition as 
it did all others.84 The document became part of the formal record of the 
legislature.85 Following formal consideration and review, “both houses of the 
assembly and the governor agreed that the request was reasonable” and they 
passed a law exempting black women from the tax.86 Native Americans 
petitioned also, often including explicit reference to their tribal identity, most 
commonly to redress concerns over tribal land claims.87 
That the Articles of Confederation mentioned petitioning only in the 
context of the rights of states should come as little surprise given the limited 
jurisdiction and structure of the federal government under the Articles.88 The 
newly formed state constitutions, however, were quick to include the right.89 
Pennsylvania, with its long history of participatory politics, and Vermont 
 
 76. Smith, supra note 34, at 1170-72. 
 77. Mark, supra note 34, at 2181-82. 
 78. BAILEY, supra note 75, at 44. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 45. 
 85. Id. at 44. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Daniel Carpenter, Indigenous Representation by Petition: Transformations in 
Iroquois Complaint and Request, 1680-1760, at 14-15 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 88. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, paras. 2-3. 
 89. Mark, supra note 34, at 2199-2203. 
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bestowed a broad right to petition on all “people” within the state.90 As they did 
in Parliament, petitions drove the legislative agenda of the colonial and state 
governments.91 Volunteer farmers and other part-time support staffed these 
nascent governing bodies, and the petitions offered a steady stream of welcome 
information.92 Given the ubiquity of the practice in eighteenth-century 
America, it was taken for granted that the U.S. Constitution would include the 
right to petition in its later-added Bill of Rights. 
B. Contextualizing the Text 
Unlike other rights delineated by the Bill of Rights, the Petition Clause 
generated very little debate during drafting and ratification. Some have 
ascribed this omission to the petition process’s being so ubiquitous and so 
mundane in the colonies by the time of the Founding that capturing the right 
required little discussion—most state constitutions had included the right as a 
matter of course, and the petition process and the purpose that it served were 
largely taken for granted. The most substantive discussion of the right to 
petition came in response to an effort to amend what would become the First 
Amendment to include a more restrictive right—the right to instruct 
representatives. It was through the rejection of this more restrictive right that 
the Framers left us with a record of their interpretation of the right to petition. 
The process of “instructing” representatives was what many at the 
Founding, but especially the Federalists, viewed as an anachronistic mechanism 
afforded the state governments in the Confederation Congress. Unlike 
petitions, instructions emanated from majorities and official institutions only. 
In the Confederation Congress, instruction allowed state governments, 
constituted by a majority, to bind a lawmaker to a particular course of action.93 
If a lawmaker failed to abide by the instructions that directed him, he risked 
recall back to his state and loss of salary.94 The mechanism of instruction in the 
Confederation Congress was itself a carryover from the colonial governments 
and had been used increasingly in the colonies as the primary means of political 
 
 90. Id. at 2201-02. 
 91. See Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the 
Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1463 (1998); Alison G. Olson, 
Eighteenth-Century Legislatures and Their Constituents, 79 J. AM. HIST. 543, 556-57 (1992); 
Alan Tully, Constituent-Representative Relationships in Early America1: The Case of Pre-
Revolutionary Pennsylvania, 11 CAN. J. HIST. 139, 143-45 (1976). 
 92. Higginson, supra note 34, at 153. 
 93. See John P. Kaminski, From Impotence to Omnipotence1: The Debate over Structuring 
Congress Under the New Federal Constitution of 1787, in HOUSE AND SENATE, supra note 21, 
at 1, 25-26. 
 94. Id. 
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engagement.95 Instructions embodied a rejection of the British conception of 
“virtual representation”—the notion that each member of Parliament 
represented the whole people and not the particular locality that elected him.96 
It was via virtual representation, Britain argued, that the colonies were 
represented in the House of Commons despite not possessing the franchise.97 
The colonies rejected virtual representation for what they termed “actual 
representation” by colonial governments and moved from petitioning to 
instructing their assemblies to declare independence from Britain.98 As Gordon 
Wood described it, 
[T]he petitioning and the instructing of representatives were rapidly becoming 
symbols of two quite different attitudes toward representation . . . . Petitioning 
implied that the representative was a superior so completely possessed of the full 
authority of all the people that he must be solicited, never commanded, by his 
particular electors . . . . Instructing, on the other hand, implied that the delegate 
represented no one but the people who elected him and that he was simply a 
mistrusted agent of his electors, bound to follow their directions.99 
Modern legislation scholarship refers to these two models of representation by 
the roughly analogous contemporary theories of trustee and agency, 
respectively.100 
Despite early enthusiasm for actual representation around the time of the 
Revolution, support of instructing as the ideal means of engaging with 
government outside of the vote would soon wane.101 Relying heavily on 
instructions had its costs, and governance in the colonies grew more 
decentralized and more fractured.102 Localities leaned heavily on instructions 
in binding general governments to the needs of their constituencies and, given 
the inevitable blurring between local and general issues, instructions 
contributed to converting the public into an “infinite number of jarring, 
disunited factions.”103 As Wood observed, the era preceding the Founding saw 
a similar decline in the version of republicanism reliant on virtue and on 
 
 95. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 189-90 
(1969). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 176. 
 98. Id. at 189. 
 99. Id. 
100. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 123-24 (1995).  
101. WOOD, supra note 95, at 195-96; see also id. at 606-15 (describing the transition in 
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acknowledgement of diverse pluralism).  
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transcendence of self-interest in the domain of lawmaking.104 With the 
factions wrought by actual representation, instructions, and other structures of 
direct democracy, the Founding generation witnessed first-hand the realities of 
human nature on which they had to construct the American republic. 
Madison framed this paradigm shift from American homogeneity and 
virtuous republican exceptionalism to the realities of pluralist politics in poetic 
terms in The Federalist No. 101: “Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an 
aliment without which it instantly expires.”105 Rather than force human 
nature into the Aristotelian virtue ethics required by antiquated republican 
forms of government, the constitutional experiment of 1787 would recognize 
the intrinsic nature of factions and the expansive range of the public good in 
order to design around these democratic “defects.”106 As Madison theorized in 
The Federalist No. 10, America could not plausibly vanquish liberty, nor could it 
enforce or expect a homogeneous vision of the good, and it was under these 
conditions that factions flourish.107 The aim of government was not to control 
the causes of faction; in Madison’s view, the aim of government was instead to 
control the effects of faction and to construct mechanisms to prevent 
competing visions of the good from debilitating the newly formed national 
government. The Framing generation would realize this goal through what 
Madison termed the “republican principle,” or the scheme of representative 
government.108 Through representative democracy, rather than a “pure” or 
direct democracy, government would control faction by passing public views 
“through the medium of a chosen body of citizens.”109 By passing the public 
will through the filter of republican government, in Madison’s vision, “it may 
well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the 
people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the 
people themselves.”110 So it was that the Framing generation reflected on the 
failures of actual representation and, in rejecting the latter, embraced a new 
form of republicanism that rejected instructions. 
The debate over whether representation in the new Congress should 
subscribe to the theory of representation aligned with instructions or one 
aligned with petitioning surfaced in the House of Representatives debates 
around drafting what would become the First Amendment. On Saturday, 
August 15, 1789, following debate over other proposed amendments, the House 
considered the text of the nascent Petition Clause: “The freedom of speech and 
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of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for 
their common good, and to apply to the Government for redress of grievances, 
shall not be infringed.”111 Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts spoke first and, 
finding the right to assemble—the necessary predicate to speaking in an era of 
low-tech communications—redundant to the right of speech, moved to strike 
the phrase “assemble and.”112 If the Constitution was to include such an obvious 
and duplicative right, Sedgwick declared, it must also declare “that a man 
should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he 
pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper.”113 
Striking out “assemble and” concerned Thomas Tudor Tucker of South 
Carolina because the phrase had been recommended by the states of Virginia 
and North Carolina.114 The recommendations of these particular southern 
states, Tucker lamented, had been largely neglected. He noted that the proposed 
amendment omitted Virginia and North Carolina’s most “material” proposal: 
the right to instruct their representatives.115 In light of the fact that Virginia 
and North Carolina might soon lose ground on the right to assemble, Tucker 
stated his intention to move to include the right of instruction following 
resolution of the motion to strike the right to assemble.116 
As the text of the Constitution reveals, the right to assemble survived the 
motion. The House then refocused its institutional attention on Tucker’s 
amendment, which would prove far more contentious than omission of the 
mere “surplusage” that was the right to assemble. At the very moment Tucker 
moved to insert the words “to instruct their Representatives,” Thomas Hartley 
of Pennsylvania exclaimed aloud that he “wished the motion had not been 
made.”117 Hartley’s concern was that the proposal had reinvigorated the 
longstanding debate over actual and virtual representation embodied in the 
distinct recognition of petitioning rather than instructions.118 Representation 
in Congress, according to Hartley, required that the people have trust in their 
representatives to govern independently. The principle of representation was 
“distinct from an agency, which may require written instructions.”119 
A majority of the House shared Hartley’s concerns with instructions as a 
“dangerous doctrine, subversive of the great end for which the United States 
have confederated,” which could prove “utterly destructive of all ideas of an 
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independent and deliberative body.”120 By allowing the right to instruct, “the 
Government would be altered from a representative one to a democracy, 
wherein all laws are made immediately by the voice of the people.”121 Such a 
right might leave the legislature open to capture by the “passions” of people, 
echoing Madison’s term for faction.122 The new legislature was expected to do 
more than simply reflect the public will. The Constitution would instead 
include a variety of checks on representation elsewhere—bicameralism for 
example—that would foster structured deliberation and an ordered lawmaking 
process in Congress.123 In order to prevent disruption of these mechanisms, the 
“right of the people to consult for the common good can go no further than to 
petition the Legislature, or apply for a redress of grievances.”124 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts espoused the minority view that the right 
to instruct was a necessary additional check on the inevitable 
maladministration of government.125 Gerry interjected that instruction would 
no more foster faction in the House than would deliberation.126 Moreover, the 
right to instruct was a fundamental component of sovereignty, according to 
Gerry, and to fail to recognize the right to instruct would cause the people to 
relinquish the sovereignty vested in them elsewhere in the Constitution.127 But 
Gerry couched his support for instructions on the theory that the instructions 
would serve to advise only and would not bind representatives to the will of 
constituent majorities.128 He also balked at the criticism of the majority that 
instructions would serve to convert the new national government into a 
democracy.129 Holding himself as among the Anti-Federalists, Gerry wholly 
expected the new government to be a democracy, just not a direct 
democracy.130 John Page of Virginia shared this view as well, seeing 
representative democracy as a necessary evil to resolve problems of scale and 
geography—were it possible for all to cast a vote, in Page’s view the 
government must allow it.131 
 
120. Id. at 1093, 1105. 
121. Id. at 1097. 
122. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (1James Madison), supra note 105, at 43-44. 
123. 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 111, at 1094. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1094-96. 
126. Id. at 1095. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. See id. at 1095-96. 
130. See id. 
131. Id. at 1101-02. 
 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause 
68 STAN L. REV. 1131 (2016) 
1152 
The majority view prevailed, declining the proposed amendment and 
rejecting the right to instruction by a vote of forty-one to ten.132 In the 
majority view, it was petitioning that ought to form the limiting principle on 
how the public could engage in the lawmaking process outside of the vote, in 
order to maintain republican principles and those mechanisms of 
representation carefully designed and detailed elsewhere in the Constitution. 
To provide the right to instruct was to require members to be bound by those 
instructions, thereby disrupting the deliberative and independent lawmaking 
process envisioned by Article I. The right to petition, by contrast, very clearly 
did not bind, yet it afforded the public a formal and transparent channel by 
which the public could “declare their sentiment . . . to the whole body.”133 
While the legislative history might convey the Founders’ personal views 
in framing the Petition Clause, there is little better evidence of the public’s 
understanding of the Petition Clause than the Framing generation’s exercise of 
the right before and after ratification—it wasted no time in doing so. Amidst 
the debates in the House and Senate over the proposed amendments, including 
the Petition Clause, Congress was affording equal, formal, and public process to 
petitioners. Historians have documented over six hundred petitions to the First 
Congress.134 Notably, petitioners of the First Congress did not limit themselves 
to matters of private concern. To provide a few examples, petitions conveyed 
grievances pertaining to a range of matters, including regulation of commerce, 
the need for public credit, the institution of slavery, requests for intellectual 
property protection, disposition of public lands, public employment and 
elections, the location of postal offices and federal courts, and the settlement of 
war debts and pensions.135 Congress most often referred these petitions to the 
executive or to a congressional committee for review and routinely provided 
each a formal response.136 Not infrequently, petitions included argument, 
charts, maps, and proposed statutory language.137 
The unenfranchised, including one Mary Katherine Goddard of Maryland, 
also petitioned the First Congress on their own behalf.138 Goddard had recently 
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been dismissed as postmistress for the city of Baltimore after serving in the 
position for over fourteen years and petitioned Congress to challenge the 
dismissal.139 Goddard argued that at the time, the Washington Administration 
mandated that only “manifest misconduct” would establish a basis for dismissal 
from public office.140 It was unclear whether Goddard’s dismissal was due to 
gender—her replacement appointee was male—or her close association with 
the Anti-Federalists through her brother, William.141 In addition to contacting 
President Washington directly, Goddard submitted Washington’s executive 
order, along with her petition signed by two hundred Baltimore businessmen, 
to the Senate for consideration.142 The Senate read her petition but declined to 
act in her favor.143 Again, it was unclear whether the refusal was driven by 
discrimination or politics, but the petition was accepted like all others.144 The 
petitions of the unenfranchised also included the petition of Jehoiakim 
McToksin, citizen of the Stockbridge, or Moheconnuck, Nation, who 
petitioned for compensation due to him for serving as an interpreter for the 
United States in the war for independence.145 Presented by the representative 
for Massachusetts, who also collected affidavits on McToksin’s behalf, the 
petition was successful, and Congress granted McToksin his unpaid salary and 
forgave his missing documentation.146 
 
139. Richard R. John & Christopher J. Young, Rites of Passage1: Postal Petitioning as a Tool of 
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Higginson, supra note 34, at 158-65. Omission of this later history of petitioning is not 
inadvertent. Rather, it is pragmatic. The secondary sources describing nineteenth-
century petitioning lend primacy to assorted debates around the gag rules largely based 
on the false premise that the gag rules caused the end of petitioning in Congress. Id. at 
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C. Contextualizing Lobbying 
A comprehensive history of lobbying, charting its course across the 
development of the American republic, has yet to be written. To the extent 
that the historiography of American politics references lobbying at all, 
historians have largely cabined their study to particular eras, interest groups, 
and legislative vehicles.147 Aside from the descriptive work of public choice 
theory, lobbying has been largely absent from political theory and political 
ethics. Political scientists have created out of whole cloth the assumption that 
“[l]obbying is probably as old as government,” with little development of the 
basis for that assumption.148 Even the origin of the term “lobbying” remains in 
dispute.149 It is as if the amorphous nature of lobbying has seeped into the very 
scholarship that surrounds it. 
Despite the invisibility of what some refer to as the “fourth branch” of 
government, the few Early Americanists to focus on lobbying describe the 
practice as wholly distinct from petitioning.150 Political historian Jeffrey 
Pasley describes lobbying as “the personal buttonholing of lawmakers by paid 
agents of special interests,” and earlier historical work of the period found little 
evidence of our modern lobbying system in the First Congress.151 Much of the 
pressure from interested groups during this period took the form of petitions, 
private letters, and engagement with the press.152 While pressure groups 
engaged in all of these tactics, the petition process constituted the primary 
means by which individuals and loose associations engaged in the lawmaking 
process.153 Pasley speculates that the absence of the comprehensive lobbying 
scheme we have today was due, at least in part, to the efficient functioning of 
petitioning.154 But, in contrast to earlier inquiry, Pasley’s review of the 
historical documents of the First Congress revealed “abundant evidence” of a 
different kind of lobbying, one of subtler and more limited form.155 
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Pasley describes this subtle and limited form of early lobbying as an 
outgrowth of petitioning.156 It was common practice at the Founding to hire 
lawyers to draft and deliver petitions on behalf of petitioners.157 The petition 
process included a range of formalities, and attorneys could prove helpful in 
navigating those formalities by drafting and presenting the documents.158 
Lawyers largely stayed away from broader policy petitions, however, mainly 
focusing their representation on petitions with individualized grievances.159 
Convinced that it might increase their chances of favorable consideration, 
some petitioners began to hire agents not only to draft and present their 
petitions but also to contact members personally and monitor the 
consideration process.160 While most petitioners or their agents delivered the 
petition and then left the capital, many began to stay and to put up extended 
residence around the seat of national government.161 Less politically connected 
and distinguished agents frequented the hallways of Congress, as well as local 
taverns, in the hopes of catching a member for casual conversation.162 Pasley 
traces an early usage of the term “lobby” to describe loiterers in the 
antechambers of Congress, where interested parties would congregate in hopes 
that they might catch a moment with a member.163 While there was extensive 
evidence of loitering in lobbies and bars,164 there is little evidence that such 
loitering was ever actually successful. 
One of the first comprehensive lobbying campaigns was waged by the 
Quakers, a community that still prides itself today on its vigorous legislative 
advocacy.165 The Quakers coupled their attempts to petition the First Congress 
to abolish slavery with an impressive lobbying campaign that included 
“looming” over the galleys, loitering in the lobbies to approach members as 
they left formal proceedings, visiting members’ temporary capital lodgings, 
and inviting members of Congress to discuss the issue over meals.166 Not 
surprisingly, the Quakers’ aggressive methods cultivated an incredible hostility 
by members against any and all forms of lobbying.167 The Quakers’ conduct 
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was unprecedented. Very few organized interests existed in the capital at that 
time, and none circumvented the petition process in ways similar to the 
Quakers.168 Following the campaign, “Congress took steps to prevent a repeat 
of the episode.”169 
The rise of our modern, ubiquitous lobbying culture did not occur until 
the mid- to late-nineteenth century.170 Some ascribe its development to 
growing dysfunction within the petition process and petitioning’s slow 
decline.171 Consideration of petitions became less formalized and Congress 
implemented a series of rules that provided petitions less prominence on the 
legislative agenda.172 While Congress undermined the petition process by a 
thousand procedural cuts, lobbying flourished, as did the reality that the ability 
to have a voice during the lawmaking process required hiring a lobbyist to 
speak on your behalf.173 With the rise of lobbying came the use of ever more 
creative practices of influencing the lawmaking process, including bribery and 
other more nefarious means.174 Public proclamations of hatred for the 
profession soon followed.175 Eventually, likely some time during the 
Progressive Era, lobbying wholly supplanted petitioning as the primary means 
of public engagement with the lawmaking process outside of the vote.176 
II. The “Decontextualized” Petition Clause 
A. Our Lobbying Regulatory Framework 
There are few today who would defend our current lobbying system on 
consequentialist grounds.177 Many, if not most, Americans hold lobbyists in 
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incredibly low regard,178 lobbying is often referred to as “legalized bribery,”179 
and the overwhelming majority of Americans believe that lobbyists routinely 
 
politically powerful could result in efficient policy outcomes. Gary S. Becker, A Theory 
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bribe members of Congress.180 Many decry lobbying as rent seeking and a 
corruption of the democratic process.181 Despite near-unanimous consensus 
that more must be done to regulate lobbying, Congress has enacted only 
minimal and ineffective regulation in the face of lobbying scandals and 
growing public concern. Some scholars, offering a more charitable 
interpretation, have speculated that the discordant views of lobbying as both 
criminal and constitutionally protected have evolved over time, resulting in a 
jumbled patchwork of lobbying laws.182 Other scholars, more cynical of the 
political process, see the corrupt handiwork of lobbyists themselves in failures 
to regulate lobbying.183 Although public opinion seems quite settled about the 
problem, Congress continues to raise concerns that any solution would violate 
the Petition Clause. A close examination of the legislative histories of these 
attempted reforms reveals that our inability to regulate lobbying is based, it 
seems, on constitutional and not consequentialist or nefarious grounds. 
Our often-criticized modern lobbying regulatory framework—namely 
light-touch registration and disclosure regimes—has its origins in our ongoing 
inability to reconcile lobbying with the Petition Clause. The legislative history 
of this scheme provides an illustrative example of the underlying tensions 
inherent in our efforts to regulate lobbying. 
On April 4, 1935, then-Senator Hugo Lafayette Black of Alabama 
introduced Bill 2512, titled “[t]o define lobbyists, to require registration of 
lobbyists, and provide regulation thereof,” into the Senate.184 The main content 
of that bill will feel familiar to anyone versed in our modern lobbying 
regulation: it offered a registration requirement, a periodic disclosure regime, 
and penalties for noncompliance. Black’s bill defined lobbying broadly, 
regulating not only direct contact with legislatures but also indirect efforts to 
influence legislation with advocacy campaigns aimed at the public. It defined 
“lobbying” as an effort to influence any political branch, legislative and 
executive, by any means possible—including direct means, like petitioning and 
appearing before committees, as well as indirect means, like publishing books 
or magazines.185 Next, the bill outlined a registration and disclosure scheme 
that would require all who engaged in “lobbying” for compensation to register 
with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate 
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before engaging in any lobbying activity.186 The bill then required the 
registrant to file monthly disclosure reports thereafter that included all income 
received, names of individuals lobbied, and names of all publications authored 
by the lobbyist.187 Failure to comply with the registration and disclosure 
regimes carried a penalty of $5000, criminal sanctions of not more than twelve 
months in prison, or both.188 
By the time that Senator Black drafted his bill, the formal petition process 
had fallen into disuse and the primary means of engagement with Congress 
was through informal mass mobilization tactics.189 The structure of the bill 
captured Senator Black’s view that petitioning encompassed the broad and 
informal practice of public-directed advocacy and mass mobilization of his day, 
including not only direct engagement with legislators but also the act of 
advocating for or against legislation in the public sphere. According to Black, 
this broad right to petition was sacrosanct, and regulation aimed at “lobbying” 
was an effort to expose abuse of the petition process in order to preserve the 
right to petition. Senator Black did not believe that the Constitution protected 
the right to “lobby,” a term that to Black encompassed only “bad lobbying” or 
abuse of the petition process. When it came to lobbying, the Senator did not 
mince words: 
There is no constitutional right to lobby. There is no right on the part of any 
greedy or predatory interest to use money taken from the pockets of the citizen 
to mislead him and thus enlist his aid in enabling the same greedy and predatory 
interest to take still more money out of the pocket of the same unsuspecting 
citizen. There is no constitutional right on the part of any sordid and powerful 
group to present its views behind a mask concealing the identity of the group. 
These money-maddened men behind the mask have no right to send their hired 
men out into the streets, into the places of business, into the homes and into the 
churches, to persuade or frighten citizens into giving blanket authority to have 
their names signed to telegrams and letters, to be later manufactured by high-
powered, high-priced publicity agents, and sent at company expense to the 
citizens’ representatives in Washington, in such way and manner as to 
deliberately deceive those representatives.190 
At the time Senator Black introduced his bill, no regulatory scheme 
governed lobbyists at the federal level. After the first thorough congressional 
investigation of lobbying activities in 1913 and a few scandals that followed, 
members began introducing a variety of bills, only to have them die in 
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committee.191 Black’s bill was similarly responsive to scandal: in 1935, the year 
that Black introduced his bill, Congress was fighting to pass the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act, commonly known as the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.192 
The Wheeler-Rayburn bill was typical of the “trust-busting” legislation 
common to the New Deal era, and it proposed bringing private utilities under 
government oversight for the first time.193 The utility companies were not 
going to take the new restrictions lying down and mounted one of the fiercest 
antilegislation campaigns that Congress had seen.194 Most notably, the utility 
companies flooded Congress with over 250,000 telegrams opposing the bill, all 
of them paid for by the utilities and most with signatures forged by utility 
employees.195 Controversy surrounding the campaign fueled both a new 
Senate investigatory committee, focused on “lobbying,” chaired by Senator 
Black and also a bill that he authored.196 
Like all of the earlier reform efforts, Black’s bill also stalled. Following an 
amendment to expand the disclosure period to three months and to broaden 
the definition of lobbyist to anyone who, for pay, attempted “to influence 
legislation, or to prevent legislation,” the Black bill quickly passed the 
Senate.197 However, it faced strong opposition in the House. William Eskridge, 
subscribing to the cynical view, has speculated that the bill’s failure was a result 
of a Senate bill dying in a lobbyist-controlled House.198 But the legislative 
history reveals a more nuanced story, grounded in a fundamental disagreement 
over the right to petition and the relationship between petitioning and 
lobbying. 
The legislative history reveals that the House Judiciary Committee stalled 
Black’s bill in order to make way for a draft of its own.199 Like Black, the House 
Committee believed that the right to petition was sacrosanct and encompassed 
the mass mobilization politics of the day. But the House Committee saw no 
daylight between Black’s distinction of petitioning and lobbying, because the 
actual regulated conduct of “influencing or preventing legislation” looked 
identical. By that time, there were no longer clear rules to govern petitioning 
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activities”). 
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and therefore abuse of that process, what Black called “lobbying,” was 
impossible to identify. Therefore, the House saw any forced registration or 
disclosure regime focused on legislative advocacy efforts, good or bad, as 
necessarily an infringement of that sacrosanct petitioning right.200 The House 
Committee would allow some infringement of the right to petition because of 
the need to balance that right against the informational interest of lawmakers. 
But that infringement must be narrowly tailored.201 
The bill was then referred to conference in order to reconcile the House 
and Senate drafts.202 The conference committee reported out a broad bill, 
expanding the registration regime to include lobbyists who target the 
executive and expanding the disclosure regime to require monthly disclosure 
reports. The broad conference bill met its expected fate in the House and was 
defeated in a floor vote by a three-to-one margin. In the debates that preceded 
the defeat, House members expressed concern that the broad bill regulated 
beyond the recent “bad lobbyists,” the utility companies, and would burden 
“good” groups who petitioned, such as “all farm organizations, all patriotic 
organizations, all women’s clubs, all peace societies.”203 These floor debates 
reveal that Black had argued convincingly for a normative distinction between 
“good” petitioning and “bad” lobbying and that bad lobbyists, like the utilities, 
had no petition rights to infringe. But House members struggled with the fact 
that the conduct that constituted “petitioning” and “lobbying” looked identical. 
Aside from penalizing those “bad lobbyists” directly, House members were not 
convinced that there existed a way to regulate unprotected bad lobbying 
without also regulating petitioning.204 
It wasn’t until ten years later, after Black’s appointment to the Supreme 
Court, that the text of the Black bill was revived, dusted off, and finally 
muscled through both chambers on the coattails of comprehensive legislative 
reform. Following World War II, the concern over associational lobbying 
intensified, and in March of 1946, Congress established yet another special 
committee—the Special Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress—to 
investigate “any or all groups which have or are engaged in the present 
propaganda campaign or lobby to defeat legislative measures for the relief of 
the acute housing shortage . . . to abolish or weaken price control; [and] all 
 
200. See id.  
201. See id. at 1-2 (describing lobbying as protected by the right to petition and then 
balancing that right against the informational interests of lawmakers, resulting in a 
narrowed bill).  
202. 80 CONG. REC. 9430 (1936). 
203. Id. at 9747. 
204. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 74-2925, at 1, 5-6 (1936) (documenting disagreements between the 
House and the Senate about who should be regulated).  
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groups which have or are engaged in the power lobby.”205 Five hurried months 
later, President Truman signed into law the Legislative Reorganization Act, 
Title III of which included the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.206 The 
scheme closely tracked the language of the 1936 conference committee bill and 
then-Senator Black’s bill, which had provided a basis for the committee bill.207 
The legislative history reveals little attention to lobbying and confusion in the 
floor debates over the effect of the legislation and its relationship with the 
right to petition.208 Despite the confusion and lack of deliberation, the 
momentum of the larger legislative reform bill would push the Lobbying Act 
through. Although widely criticized as toothless and ineffective,209 Black’s 
regime of registration and disclosure has served as the basis for all lobbying 
regulation since 1946, replaced only by statutes that have adopted the same 
registration and disclosure framework while strengthening requirements 
around the edges. 
B. Our Muddled Petition Clause Doctrine 
A similar definitional muddle pervades our Petition Clause jurisprudence. 
The First Amendment provides that: “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”210 Huddled at the end of this famous amendment is the nearly 
forgotten Petition Clause. By comparison to other First Amendment 
protections, the Supreme Court has only rarely turned its attention to this 
particular piece of text. On those rare occasions where it has, the Court has 
adopted a form of simple textualism uncommon to its First Amendment 
jurisprudence211 and has abstained, perhaps out of necessity, from relying on 
the historical context that so often provides an interpretive frame for its First 
 
205. 92 CONG. REC. 2338 (1946) (introducing House Resolution 557, a resolution to establish 
the special committee in the House); see also S. REP. NO. 1011, at 27 (1946).  
206. Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. III, 60 Stat. 812, 839 (1946) (repealed 1995). 
207. Compare id., with 80 CONG. REC. 9430-31 (1936), and S. 2512, 74th Cong. (1935). 
208. 92 CONG. REC. 6552 (1946). 
209. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON FED. LOBBYING LAWS, supra note 31, at 6 n.53; Moshe Cohen-
Eliya & Yoav Hammer, Nontransparent Lobbying as a Democratic Failure, 2 WM. & MARY 
POL’Y REV. 265, 286 (2011); Craig Holman, Disclosure Is Fine, but Genuine Lobbying Reform 
Must Focus on Behavior, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2006, at 5, 5.  
210. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
211. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (noting that First 
Amendment analysis necessarily draws on contextual history of First Amendment 
text and has “long eschewed any ‘narrow, literal conception’ of the Amendment’s 
terms” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963))). 
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Amendment jurisprudence.212 A review of the legislative history and doctrine 
reveals that much of this simple textualism derives from the heavy 
involvement of a single individual: famed textualist and First Amendment 
absolutist Hugo Lafayette Black. 
Justice Hugo Black is often referred to as the “patron saint” of modern 
textualism.213 But among his lesser-known accomplishments is his role as the 
patron saint of modern lobbying law. Black drafted the first comprehensive 
scheme to regulate lobbying, a bill that provided the foundation for our 
current lobbying regime,214 while serving as Senator for Alabama and drafted 
the pillars of our Petition Clause doctrine215 after his appointment to the 
Court.216 To each, Black applied his self-described “literalist”217 interpretative 
method. 
Following his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Black drafted 
Noerr, the first case to address the right to petition in any depth, and a number 
of other key cases in the Petition Clause constellation.218 In each, Black 
brought his normative distinction between petitioning and lobbying and his 
“literalist” interpretive method to bear on the Clause. Although Black described 
his methodology as friendly to the incorporation of context and history in the 
interpretation of text,219 at that time the history of petitioning was not before 
the Court.220 Without an understanding of the history of the petition right, 
 
212. We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, 
J., concurring) (describing the Court’s regular reliance on history and rejection of a 
“literalism” approach in interpreting the First Amendment and collecting cases).  
213. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Bullets, Ballots, and Battles on the Roberts Court, 35 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 445, 449 (2009). 
214. See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-14 (2014). 
215. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961). 
216. See infra Part II.B.1. 
217. Although Black and others have described Black’s early textualist method as “literalist,” 
the term is a bit of a misnomer. The more accurate term would be “semantic-ist,” 
denoting a narrow focus on the semantic meaning of text. Stephen C. Levinson, 
PRAGMATICS 17-18 (2009) (describing the distinction as one between Grice’s speaker-
meaning and sentence-meaning, but also noting that the distinction is not always 
clear). As contemporary legislation scholars, including John Manning, have identified, 
the “literalist” textualists of the Progressive Era suffered from the inaccuracies of 
interpreting text in the absence of context. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity 
of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108-09 (2001). Modern textualists have remedied 
these earlier interpretive missteps by incorporating an understanding of context as 
defined by the field of pragmatics. Id. 
218. See infra Part II.B.2. 
219. HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 10 (1968). 
220. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 25-28, 28 n.21, Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (No. 50) 1960 WL 
98829; see also We the People Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 148-49 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., concurring) (noting that the Court had not yet tussled with the 
historical argument in relation to the Petition Clause and speculating that the change 
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Black turned to the text of the Petition Clause devoid of context and against a 
background of changed circumstances. As is common for decontextualized 
interpretations,221 the Court’s “literalist” interpretation of the Petition Clause 
resulted first in an overinclusivity—for example, merely containing the term 
“petition” or “grievance” brought practices within the purview of the doctrine, 
and the Court expanded the petition right to include filing “petitions” in courts 
and administrative agencies, the filing of “grievances” by public employees, and 
any form of legislative advocacy.222 
In the absence of this context, the Court has struggled to provide clear and 
fixed meanings to the Petition Clause, often conflating practices historically 
distinct but termed similarly in modern parlance. Eventually succumbing to 
the lack of structure behind its Petition Clause analysis, thirty years ago the 
Court effectively subsumed the right to petition under the more developed 
doctrine of the Free Speech Clause.223 It was not until 2011, when faced with 
this history, that the Court began to contextualize and clarify its Petition 
Clause analysis in order to establish a distinct Petition Clause doctrine.224 
Scholars have been quick to criticize this doctrinal muddle,225 but the 
development of the doctrine in disparate substantive fields of law, from labor 
to civil rights, has prevented the criticism from forming a chorus loud enough 
to be heard. More importantly, the lack of intensive regulation and litigation 
in the field of lobbying law and the development of the Petition Clause 
doctrine between camps of legal scholarship has deterred a comprehensive 
 
in doctrine would prove drastic given the Court’s preference for reliance on history in 
interpretation of the First Amendment). 
221. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 419-
20 (1989). Although interpretive theory in this area is still ripe for future development, 
Sunstein also begins to describe the interaction between literalism and changed 
circumstances. Id. at 422-23. 
222. See infra Part II.B.2. This process is referred to in linguistics as “word-sense 
disambiguation,” or the ability of humans to discern from context the particular sense 
of the meaning of the word used. Mark Stevenson & Yorick Wilks, Word-Sense 
Disambiguation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 249, 249 
(Ruslan Mitkov ed., 2003). As Stevenson and Wilks describe, the term light could 
denote weight, as in “not heavy,” or “illumination.” Id. at 249. 
223. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482, 485 (1985). 
224. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011). 
225. See, e.g., RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS 
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A 
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 10 (2012); Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K1: The “Difficult 
Constitutional Question” of Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1299, 1302 (2003); John T. Delacourt, The FTC’s Noerr-Pennington Task Force1: 
Restoring Rationality to Petitioning Immunity, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 36, 36-37; 
Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1177, 
1177-79 (1992); William A. Herbert, The Chill of a Wintry Light?1: Borough of Duryea v. 
Guarnieri and the Right to Petition in Public Employment, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 617-22 
(2012); Smith, supra note 34, at 1153. 
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review of the Petition Clause doctrine. What follows is the beginning of a 
broader review of the doctrine and an effort to highlight the incoherence 
wrought on the right to petition through the lack of a contextualized 
interpretation. 
1. Origins 
Although the Supreme Court referenced the right to petition in dicta in 
two nineteenth-century opinions—once as a predicate to the right to 
associate226 and another as a predicate to the right to interstate travel227—the 
Court’s first opportunity for substantive analysis of the right to petition came 
in 1954. In an era of increasing political ferment, 1954 began the term that the 
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education228 and that the world’s leaders 
convened in Geneva in efforts to bring peace in Vietnam. Also in that same 
year, in United States v. Harriss, the Court reviewed a First Amendment 
challenge to the statute born of Senator Black’s early handiwork and the first 
statute to provide comprehensive regulation of lobbyists: the Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946.229 
The sections of the Lobbying Act at issue in Harriss, sections 305, 307, and 
308, mandated registration requirements for all individuals and groups who 
accepted money to influence “directly or indirectly” legislation in Congress and 
required quarterly reporting of all moneys received and expended, as well as 
the name of the legislation lobbied for or against.230 Application of the 
Lobbying Act was broad and the statute purported to regulate 
any person . . . who by himself, or through any agent or employee or other 
persons in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or 
receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or the 
principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the 
following purposes: 
(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United 
States. 
(b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any 
legislation by the Congress of the United States.231 
The Lobbying Act also built on Black’s framework by adding the additional 
penalty of a three-year lobbying ban for any violations of the registration and 
disclosure requirements.232 
 
226. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1876). 
227. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44 (1868). 
228. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
229. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); see also Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. III, 60 
Stat. 812, 839 (repealed 1995). 
230. Id. at 614 n.1, 618-19. 
231. Id. at 618-19 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 266). 
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Despite the victory celebrated by reformers following passage of the 
Lobbying Act, the scheme suffered from serious flaws, not the least of which 
was hurried, compromised drafting throughout the Act.233 In addition to 
clumsy drafting errors, the Act was also structurally unsound and lacked an 
enforcement mechanism outside of criminal penalties, which were presumably 
enforceable by the Department of Justice.234 The Act’s disclosure requirements 
were also unclear and treated contributions by lobbyists and contributions to 
lobbyists as functionally identical expenditures.235 Not surprisingly, given the 
questionable enforcement measures, very few prosecutions were brought 
pursuant to the Lobbying Act, and it took eight years for a constitutional 
challenge to come before the Court.236 
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act,237 
the United States challenged the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia’s dismissal of an information against a number of associational and 
individual defendants.238 Relying on National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. 
McGrath,239 the lower court had held the statute unconstitutional and dismissed 
the ten-count information,240 which charged multiple violations of the 
Lobbying Act.241 The government appealed. 
In Harriss, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, reversed the 
district court’s dismissal and upheld the Lobbying Act as constitutional. In 
reaching this decision, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of four 
provisions of the Lobbying Act on vagueness and First Amendment 
grounds.242 Because Harriss is so uniformly presumed as the case where the 
 
232. Id. at 626-27. 
233. See id. at 631 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority was “rewrit[ing] the Act” 
by providing a limit on the definition of “lobbying” because the language used in the 
Act was expansive and lacked any real limit). 
234. See id. at 633-34 (1Jackson, J., dissenting). 
235. See id. at 633 (“The Act passed by Congress would appear to apply to all persons who . . . 
(2) receive and expend funds for the purpose of lobbying, or (3) merely expend funds 
for the purpose of lobbying.”); see also Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, Pub. 
L. No. 79-601, tit. III, 60 Stat. 812, 839 (repealed 1995). 
236. Eskridge, supra note 183, at 12. 
237. Act of March 2, 1907, .ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246. 
238. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 613-17. 
239. In National Ass’n of Manufacturers, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1952), a three-judge panel 
struck down sections 303 through 307 of the Lobbying Act as unconstitutionally vague 
in contravention of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and held section 
310(b), the lobbying ban penalty, unconstitutional under the Free Speech and Petition 
Clauses of the First Amendment. Id. at 514. 
240. United States v. Harris, 109 F. Supp. 641, 641-42 (D.D.C. 1953), rev’d, 347 U.S. 612. 
241. Brief for the United States, Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (No. 32), 1953 WL 79232, at *3, *22-23. 
242. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617 (“The ‘invalidity’ of the Lobbying Act is asserted on three 
grounds: (1) that §§ 305, 307, and 308 are too vague and indefinite to meet the 
 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2016) 
1167 
Supreme Court held definitively that Congress violates the Petition Clause by 
banning or heavily regulating lobbying, including a notable recent misreading 
by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC,243 it is worthwhile to explore 
the case in depth to dispel this presumption. 
The Court began in Harriss with a vagueness challenge. With respect to the 
disclosure requirement, the Court avoided any accusations of vagueness by 
interpreting the requirements to apply to paid lobbyists only.244 In analyzing 
section 307, the definition of lobbying, the Court drew on United States v. 
Rumely, a case that interpreted similar statutory language and legislative 
history, to clarify that the Act applied to “lobbying in its commonly accepted 
sense” only,245 that is, “to direct communication with members of Congress on 
pending or proposed federal legislation.”246 Following this clarification of 
section 307, the Court held that its narrowed construction rendered the 
disclosure requirement sufficiently definite to survive constitutional 
scrutiny.247 
Turning next to the First Amendment, the Court addressed all clauses en 
masse and held in a summary fashion that the disclosure and registration 
requirements of the Lobbying Act, as construed, “d[id] not violate the freedoms 
guaranteed by the First Amendment—freedom to speak, publish, and petition 
the Government.”248 Its analysis was similarly general and held that the state 
interest in providing lawmakers and the public information on who was 
pressuring Congress and in “maintain[ing] the integrity of a basic 
governmental process” outweighed any potential chilling effect on the exercise 
of “First Amendment rights.”249 Although the Court did not specify the 
 
requirements of due process; (2) that §§ 305 and 308 violate the First Amendment 
guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the right to petition the 
Government; (3) that the penalty provision of § 310 (b) violates the right of the people 
under the First Amendment to petition the Government.”).  
243. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
244. Id. at 618-19. 
245. Id. at 620 (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953)). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 622-24. 
248. Id. at 625.  
249. Id. at 625-26. Although the Court approached its First Amendment analysis without 
specifying a particular clause, the balancing test applied by the Court bore a similarity 
to a line of cases later termed the compelled-speech doctrine and, given the fact that 
the Lobbying Act was a disclosure regime, the similarity should come as no surprise. 
Originating in 1943 with West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the 
compelled-speech doctrine held that the Free Speech Clause “includes both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) 
(Murphy, J., concurring). Similar to the reasoning in Harriss, the Court initially 
identified the right as one generic to the “First Amendment,” without specifying a 
particular clause. Id. at 642 (majority opinion). It was not until 1977 in Wooley v. 
Maynard that the Court stated explicitly that the compelled-speech doctrine sourced 
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particular clause on which its determination rested, its analysis resembled its 
later compelled-speech doctrine developed to analyze similar disclosure 
regimes.250 
Finally, the Court addressed the challenge to section 310(b), the three-year 
lobbying ban as a penalty for failing to comply with the registration and 
disclosure requirements, as violative of the Petition Clause.251 The challenge to 
section 310(b) on Petition Clause grounds presented the only clear right to 
petition challenge against the only clear prohibition on petitioning and 
lobbying activity in Harriss. The Court expressly declined to reach this issue. 
Explaining that section 310(b) was a penalty and, therefore, had not yet been 
applied to the defendants and might not ever apply if they were found 
innocent, the Court found it “unnecessary to pass on [the] contention” whether 
the lobbying ban in section 310(b) violated the Petition Clause.252 Contrary to 
broad misconception, in reviewing the first comprehensive scheme regulating 
lobbying and the last lobbying regulatory scheme to come before it, the Court 
declined to address whether the Petition Clause prohibited Congress from 
regulating lobbying.253 
2. Applying the clause to “lobbying” 
To the extent that a law of public engagement with the lawmaking process 
exists, Hugo Black had an influential hand in crafting it. Seven years after 
Harriss, Justice Black spurred the development of what would become our 
modern Petition Clause doctrine. This early doctrine also bore Black’s broad 
conception of the right and his “literalist” interpretation of the Petition Clause. 
In drafting Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,254 
Justice Black addressed the meaning of the Petition Clause for the first time in 
depth, introducing into the doctrine his literalist interpretation of the right to 
petition as encompassing any form of advocacy aimed at influencing 
 
from the Free Speech Clause. See 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). Later cases have followed suit 
and have consistently analyzed disclosure regimes as affronts to the right of free 
speech. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (noting a series of cases analyzing First 
Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 366-67 (2010) (analyzing disclosure and disclaimer provisions under the 
compelled-speech doctrine). 
250. Compare Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625-26 (upholding a disclosure regime on the grounds that 
it provided information necessary for well-informed legislators and noting that the 
regime did not prohibit speech), with Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67 (upholding a 
disclosure regime on the grounds that it provided information necessary for a well-
informed electorate and noting that the regime did not prohibit speech). 
251. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626-27. 
252. Id. at 627. 
253. Id.  
254. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
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government action, no matter the audience and no matter the form. Black’s 
broad literalism, omitting all reference to the historical context that defined 
the scope of the right, would set the stage for a series of cases that articulate the 
petition right as it stands today. 
In Noerr, the Court reviewed a gaggle of antitrust claims under the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts that railroad and trucking operators had aimed at 
one another in the midst of a freight war.255 The association for the trucking 
industry had initiated the suit, alleging that the association for the railroad 
industry had engaged in anticompetitive conduct with its publicity campaign 
against the truckers.256 In particular, the truckers alleged that the railroads had 
conducted a public directed-advocacy campaign, using the “third-party 
technique,”257 whereby the railroad’s public relations firm would foster fake 
“so-called ‘independent’ citizens groups” that would “circulate false and 
malicious propaganda” that aimed to stop the passage of legislation favorable to 
the truckers.258 While a few allegations alluded to contact with government 
officials, the truckers’ complaint largely focused on anticompetitive conduct 
directed at the public.259 Rather than anything analogous with the historical 
petition right, the truckers’ complaint fell quite squarely into the domain of the 
Free Speech Clause. 
In fact, the railroads in Noerr argued the case under the anonymous speech 
doctrine260 and attempted to distinguish United States v. Harriss and others like 
it.261 These earlier cases had balanced protections for anonymous speech with 
lawmakers’ strong informational interest in knowing the identity of the 
speaker.262 Distinguishing these cases on the ground that they dealt with direct 
participation in the lawmaking process, the railroads argued that this case was 
aimed at influencing public discourse and, thus, attempts to speak anonymously 
through “third-party” campaigns should incur heightened speech 
protections.263 The Court was persuaded that the case raised First Amendment 
concerns, but rather than relying on the Free Speech Clause and the 
anonymous speech doctrine, the Court sua sponte analogized the railroads’ 
conduct to petitioning.264 
 
255. See id. at 129-30. 
256. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. E. R.R. Presidents Conference, 113 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. 
Pa. 1953). 
257. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 220, at 27. 
258. Noerr, 113 F. Supp. at 741. 
259. See id. at 741-42. 
260. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 220, at 27. 
261. Id. at *29-30. 
262. See id. (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)). 
263. See id. at 23, 29-30. 
264. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961). 
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Writing for the Court, Justice Black again invoked his understanding of 
petitioning as a practice that spanned broadly to encompass any form of 
legislative advocacy and communication, no matter the audience.265 As Justice 
Black had known all too well from his days as a senator, “[i]n a representative 
democracy such as this, these branches of government act on behalf of the 
people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends 
upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their 
representatives.”266 To Black, who had served in the Senate after the formal 
process of petitioning had fallen into disuse, any form of communication 
directed at the public or otherwise regarding a legislative matter fell into the 
category of petitioning.267 Accordingly, any interpretation of the Sherman Act 
that might impede this fundamental mechanism of representation could not 
accurately depict the intent behind the Act, Justice Black wrote, and had no 
basis in its legislative history.268 It was only in the alternative that the Court 
relied on the Petition Clause, citing potential constitutional questions with any 
restriction the Act placed on “mere solicitation of governmental action with 
respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.”269 
3. Expanding the clause to courts and the executive 
Over the next twenty years, applying the same literalist interpretation of 
the petition right established in Noerr and in the absence of context around the 
history and meaning of the right to petition, the Court expanded the petition 
right to protect anything termed a “petition” filed in formal proceedings in the 
judicial and executive branches.270 The Court began by bringing “petitions” 
filed in courts under the protection of the Petition Clause. Then, relying on 
 
265. See id. at 137-39. 
266. Id. at 137. 
267. Four years later, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, the Court revisited Noerr1’s 
exception to the Sherman Act for legislative advocacy and squarely applied the 
exception to conduct that more closely resembled petitioning—namely, direct 
engagement with the Secretary of Labor. 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965). 
268. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138-39. 
269. Id. at 138. Some have called into question the extent to which Noerr rested its analysis 
on Justice Black’s Petition Clause reasoning, rather than on a simple interpretation of 
the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2502-03 
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
270. A quick point of theoretical clarification: I am critical only of the grounds for the 
Court’s expansion of the petition right to courts and the executive. A contextualized 
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this doctrine, the Court further expanded the reach of Noerr-Pennington 
antitrust immunity to judicial and executive “petitioning.” 
Two years after Brown v. Board of Education and for the first time in almost 
a hundred years, the state of Virginia amended certain professional ethics rules 
governing client solicitation by lawyers.271 The amendment prohibited 
solicitation of legal business by any “individual or organization which retains a 
lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not a party and in which it 
has no pecuniary right or liability.”272 As part of their efforts at integration, the 
NAACP solicited the parents of Virginia school children to become clients and 
then provided those parents with an attorney.273 Not coincidentally, this 
amendment brought the litigation strategy implemented by the NAACP to 
integrate southern schools squarely within the prohibitions of the ethics 
rules.274 The NAACP challenged the rules in state court primarily on 
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection grounds, but the 
Virginia courts upheld the laws.275 The NAACP then petitioned for certiorari, 
and the Supreme Court reversed.276 
In what was likely a surprising move, the Court declined to adopt the 
NAACP’s primary argument: that the rules offended notions of due process and 
equal protection and, therefore, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.277 Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, relied instead on the NAACP’s alternative 
grounds and struck down the ethics rules as violative of the First 
Amendment.278 Echoing the approach taken in Harriss, the Court addressed the 
First Amendment en masse, conflating the rights to speak, associate, and 
petition under a conjoined right that the Court referred to as a right to 
“vigorous advocacy.”279 The First Amendment, the Court held, protected 
“vigorous advocacy” against government regulation because it constituted a 
form of political expression.280 The Court reasoned that political expression in 
the form of filing petitions in court was essential for minorities who would 
“find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot” and 
where “under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the 
sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of 
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grievances.”281 Among other purely associational rights, the Court also relied 
on Noerr for the principle that disruption of organized legislative advocacy 
could raise important “First Amendment” questions.282 Later opinions, drafted 
by Justice Black, made clear that the right of access to courts rested firmly 
within the specific protections of the Petition Clause.283 
A few years after NAACP v. Button, the Court expanded the scope of the 
Petition Clause again to include the “petitions” filed by prisoners pursuant to 
the writ of habeas corpus.284 Justice Fortas wrote for the Court in Johnson v. 
Avery and struck down a Tennessee statute prohibiting prisoners from 
assisting other prisoners with habeas corpus petitions.285 The state of 
Tennessee, finding the quality of habeas petitions falling rapidly in the hands 
of untrained “jailhouse lawyers”—prisoners turned professional petition 
writers—had decided to ban the practice.286 In striking down the law, the Court 
held that the ban, in the absence of the prison offering any alternative, 
effectively barred uneducated and illiterate prisoners from exercising the 
“right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus”287—a right the 
Court later clarified derived from the Petition Clause. 
Finally, just a few months after Justice Black retired from the bench, the 
Court took what it saw as the next natural step under Johnson and expanded the 
Noerr-Pennington “lobbying” exception to reach advocacy directed at the courts 
and the executive.288 “Certainly,” Justice Douglas wrote in reliance on Johnson, 
“the right to petition extends to all departments of Government. The right of 
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to petition.”289 Belying 
this expansive interpretation, the facts of California Motor Transport Co. 
challenged the Court’s earlier absolute petition right. Rather than a simple 
antitrust claim involving allegations of judicial and administrative actions, the 
association in California Motor Transport Co. alleged that a competitor had 
initiated a flood of judicial and administrative actions as a means to crowd out 
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and undermine the associations’ own pending actions.290 The competitor was 
functionally engaging with the courts and agencies as an advocate, but the 
alleged purpose of the actions was to blockade the court and agencies from the 
advocacy of others.291 
Black’s literalist right to petition from Noerr that promised unfettered 
access to formal government institutions began to call out for a limiting 
principle.292 Unlike the marketplace of ideas for speech, access to these 
institutions was a finite resource, and the right to petition could not mean 
absolute access that disrupted the functioning of government and foreclosed 
the access of others.293 That the conduct was unethical, however, would not 
provide the limit. Noerr had confronted a large-scale public relations campaign 
where the railroad industry had organized fake advocacy associations and 
engaged in “third party technique” campaigns under the identities of well-
known and well-compensated experts, but the Court had still shielded the 
conduct from the antitrust laws.294 Later cases further emphasized that the 
exception in Noerr applied to any “concerted effort to influence public officials 
regardless of intent or purpose.”295 
Maneuvering carefully around these earlier exceptions, the Court seized 
on some spare language in Noerr1296 and crafted what is known as the sham 
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.297 Under this exception, the Court 
declined to shield the association’s executive and judicial actions on the ground 
that the actions were mere “shams”—i.e., not a “concerted effort to influence 
public officials” but conduct aimed at blocking a competitor’s access to 
government.298 The Court analogized the sham exception to abuse of 
government process in many other contexts—for example, obtaining a patent 
through fraud to block a competitor or bribing a government official.299 
Contrary to Noerr1’s broad right to petition that shielded advocacy through 
formal process, the sham exception allowed liability for advocacy that had a 
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tendency to “corrupt the administrative or judicial processes.”300 The sham 
exception has failed to provide much of a limit. Most notably and with some 
irony, lower courts have declined to apply the sham exception to the context 
from which it derived in Noerr—that is, legislative petitioning—because 
abandonment of the formal petition process has left the courts without a 
baseline against which to gauge improper advocacy.301 To the Court, our 
lobbying system of today in Congress is seen as “no holds barred.” 
4. Conflating the clause into speech 
Engagement with government outside of the formal processes offered by 
litigation and administrative actions presented the Court with an even greater 
challenge. Black himself struggled to draw this fine distinction. As a former 
legislator who had served during a period where formal petitioning had 
receded from view, Black’s decontextualized understanding of petitioning 
defined petitioning so broadly as to include any form of advocacy that 
addressed legislation. Also, as an absolutist, Black eschewed a First Amendment 
doctrine that balanced the limitation of a First Amendment right against any 
government interest, including the continued functioning of government.302 
These two views presented particular challenges in the context of petitioning. 
In contrast to speech directed at an open marketplace, petitioning addressed 
direct engagement with government, which could require affirmative 
government action and had the potential to wholly disrupt government 
functioning. There are meaningful differences between limiting government 
interference with a political speech in a park and requiring the government by 
constitutional fiat to allow the same speech on the floor of Congress or inside a 
prison, but the Petition Clause doctrine failed to provide the Court the tools to 
manage these differences. 
The Court had begun to establish some limits on the petition right with 
respect to formal litigation and agency actions, but outside of those formal 
processes and without the history to guide it, there was little to assist the Court 
in limiting the right. Had the Court looked to the history, as the Court had 
with its speech doctrine, it might have provided some formal limits to the 
petition right. But the history was not before the Court. Given the overlap 
between the broad petition right and free speech, the Court began to look for 
 
300. Id. at 513. 
301. See, e.g., Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“The sham exception is more easily applied to litigation, however, than it is to 
lobbying before executive or legislative bodies.”); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION ¶ 204, at 262 (2015). 
302. HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 188-89 (1996); NOAH FELDMAN, 
SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 143 
(2010); JAMES J. MAGEE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: ABSOLUTIST ON THE COURT 5 (1980). 
 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2016) 
1175 
limits within the fully developed speech doctrine, eventually conflating the 
two clauses.303 
The doctrine of protest was an area in which the Court, including in 
opinions drafted by Black, began to conflate petitioning and speech early on 
and so it bears particular mention. In the early 1960s, at the height of the civil 
rights movement, law enforcement officers arrested over 150 African-
American students for entering and protesting on the South Carolina state 
legislature’s grounds in alleged breach of the peace.304 The students met at a 
nearby church and walked together to the grounds in order to protest. The 
purpose of this protest, as described by the students, was 
to submit a protest to the citizens of South Carolina, along with the Legislative 
Bodies of South Carolina, our feelings and dissatisfaction with the present 
condition of discriminatory actions against Negroes, in general, and to let them 
know that we were dissatisfied and that we would like for the laws which 
prohibited Negro privileges in this State to be removed.305 
The students challenged their convictions on First Amendment grounds and, 
in Edwards v. South Carolina, the Court held that the students had exercised 
their First Amendment rights “in their most pristine and classic form.”306 
Although the Court did not specify explicitly that it rested its decision on the 
Petition Clause, it described the protest as a peaceable assembly whereby the 
students “expressed their grievances ‘to the citizens of South Carolina, along 
with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina.’”307 In striking down the 
convictions as violative of the students’ “First Amendment freedoms,” the 
Court noted especially that the legislature was located on the grounds of the 
protest and was in session on that day.308 
Later cases struggled, however, to maintain the distinct doctrine of protest 
as petition, rather than speech. Just a few years after the Court’s ruling in 
Edwards, the Court faced a nearly identical set of facts in Adderley v. Florida.309 
On an afternoon in Florida, approximately 200 students walked from their 
nearby school to the local jail in order to protest the jail’s discriminatory policy 
of segregation and the recent arrest of their classmates following another 
protest.310 When a number of students declined to leave the jail premises upon 
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request by custodians of the jail, the police arrested the students for trespass.311 
Justice Black, writing for the Court, unexpectedly upheld the convictions. 
Without mention of his expansive petition right, Black distinguished Edwards 
and upheld the law on speech principles, invoking reasoning that sounded in 
the public forum doctrine familiar to free speech.312 Unlike the capitol 
grounds, Black reasoned, the jail had not been traditionally open to the 
public.313 Moreover, the students had entered the jail through a driveway not 
open to public traffic and “without warning to or permission from the 
sheriff.”314 
The dissent took issue with Black’s framing of the case as dealing simply 
with speech.315 As an outgrowth of the executive, the jail, the dissent argued, 
was as much a branch of government as the courts and legislatures, and the 
Court had defined a broad petition right under NAACP v. Button that spanned 
across all three branches.316 Given the Court’s earlier holdings, whether the jail 
had been open to the public was immaterial in the dissent’s view to analysis of 
the case under the Petition Clause and was even less important in cases 
addressing the rights of minorities where the “[c]onventional methods of 
petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off to large groups of our 
citizens.”317 The dissent argued vigorously that the students had not disrupted 
the jail, nor had the students obstructed the entrances to the jail, and they had 
moved upon request.318 But a limitless petition right that allowed groups to 
enter government property, even prisons, at any time and without notice was 
too much for the Court—and even Justice Black—to bear. Out of necessity, the 
Court began to back away from its Petition Clause doctrine. 
The Court’s steady project of conflating the Free Speech and Petition 
Clauses finally came to a conclusion in a pair of cases brought before the Court 
in the mid-1980s.319 In the first, Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. 
Knight, the Court reviewed a challenge brought by community college 
instructors against a Minnesota statute that assigned the instructors a 
representative with whom the state college would “meet and confer” over 
college administrative matters and employment terms for the faculty.320 The 
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instructors took issue with the statute because it prevented anyone aside from 
the assigned representative from attending and participating in the meet-and-
confer sessions. That the college refused to “meet and confer” with them over 
college administrative policy and employment terms, the instructors alleged, 
violated their First Amendment rights. Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
Court, upheld the law and, without citation to any earlier cases developing the 
broad petition right, stated in sweeping terms that “[n]othing in the First 
Amendment or in this Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights 
to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or 
respond to individuals’ communications on public issues.”321 The Court framed 
the instructors’ argument as one radically more broad than a simple request for 
access to a public forum. Rather, the Court saw in the instructors’ case an effort 
to create a constitutional right out of whole cloth that would afford individuals 
a “right to participate directly in government” and would require all branches 
of government “to afford every interested member of the public an 
opportunity to present testimony before any policy is adopted.”322 
Such a right, the Court reasoned, “would work a revolution in existing 
government practices,” raise concerns of federalism and separation of powers, 
and transform our republican form of government into a direct democracy.323 
Nowhere in the opinion does the Court reference the history of the petition 
process, and later courts have noted that the history was not before the Court 
at that time.324 Confronted with a request for an expansive petition right 
devoid of any limiting principle that the history of the Petition Clause could 
provide, the Court was unable to envision a more limited form of formal 
public engagement with the lawmaking process. Consequently, the Court may 
have stripped the petition right of one of its core distinctive characteristics—
that is, the right to formal consideration and response—and conflated 
implicitly the right to petition and the speech right. 
The Court issued the opinion generally recognized as conflating explicitly 
the Free Speech and Petition Clauses a few months later.325 In McDonald v. 
Smith, the Court again reviewed a narrow question: whether immunity from 
libel extended to letters sent to the President.326 The letters’ aim was to disrupt 
the appointment process for a potential U.S. Attorney whom the letter accused 
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of fraud and other ethical violations.327 The letters had their intended effect, 
and the thwarted candidate commenced a libel action.328 The Court’s holding 
was narrow: even assuming the letters were petitions, they were subject to the 
libel laws.329 Despite this seemingly narrow holding, many read the Court’s 
sweeping language in the opinion as the death knell for a distinctive Petition 
Clause doctrine.330 In particular, the Court described the right to petition as 
“cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment,” 
and it held the right “inseparable” from the “freedoms to speak, publish, and 
assemble.”331 In light of this inseparability, the Court held, “there is no sound 
basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a 
petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions.”332 
The Court’s conflation of petitioning and speech inspired a flurry of 
scholarly commentary and criticism.333 In just a few years following the 
Court’s ruling in McDonald, a number of scholars began to unearth the history 
of petitioning in order to challenge the Court’s decontextualized view of the 
Petition Clause.334 Two historical pieces, published just months after the Court 
issued its decision in McDonald, provided a detailed history of petitioning at the 
Founding and stretching back to medieval England and criticized the Court for 
its failure to recognize the distinctive concerns at issue with the Petition 
Clause.335 Many others soon followed, calling for a strengthened and 
distinctive petition right rooted in an historical understanding of the Clause.336 
5. An historic revival 
In 2011, the Court confronted the historical literature crafted post-
McDonald for the first time in the context of a contentious employment dispute 
between a chief of police and his small-town employer in Pennsylvania. In 
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, Charles Guarnieri brought suit against his city 
employer for retaliation, alleging violations of his Petition Clause rights.337 
Guarnieri had initially brought a public employee grievance pursuant to his 
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collective bargaining agreement, challenging his termination as chief of 
police.338 In adjudicating the grievance, the arbitrator held that the city had 
committed procedural errors in processing Guarnieri’s termination and 
ordered Guarnieri reinstated.339 In processing the reinstatement, the city issued 
Guarnieri a series of additional job requirements and restrictions, which 
Guarnieri challenged as retaliatory in a subsequent employee grievance and a 
§ 1983 action.340 
The lower courts had recently split over whether the content of the 
grievance must address a matter of public concern in order to obtain 
protection under the Petition Clause.341 Following the Court’s conflation of the 
Petition and Free Speech Clauses in McDonald, many courts of appeals had 
begun to import the “public concern” doctrine from the Free Speech Clause, 
which prohibited retaliation claims against public employers unless the speech 
was a matter of public concern, into the Petition Clause doctrine of public 
employee grievances.342 The Third Circuit in Guarnieri split the circuits by 
declining to apply the public concern doctrine.343 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy recounted the long history of 
petitioning from Magna Charta to the modern day and emphasized the 
importance of history in interpreting the Petition Clause as wholly distinct 
from the right to free speech.344 Kennedy clarified that, contrary to broad 
misconception, the Court had not conflated the Free Speech and Petition 
Clauses in McDonald and that the rights aimed at distinct democratic functions: 
“The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns 
to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to 
speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative 
democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs.”345 Belying 
these distinctions, however, Kennedy went on to apply the public concern 
doctrine to Guarnieri’s grievance.346 The Court’s reasons were pragmatic: to 
raise every employment dispute to a matter of constitutional significance 
would result in an inadministrable standard.347 The same concerns that 
motivated the public concern doctrine in the context of speech were equally 
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presented by employee grievances—namely, that the government needs a 
limiting principle to allow for less disruption to government operations by 
employee disputes—and allowing a different standard in the context of 
grievances could allow easy circumvention of the speech rule.348 If every public 
employee grievance was a petition protected by the Petition Clause, as the 
Court assumed it had earlier held, this left the Court with no limiting principle 
in order to protect the efficient functioning of government from the flood of 
potential litigation.349 The Court acknowledged the history and established a 
distinct Petition Clause doctrine, but it saw the public concern doctrine as a 
necessary limiting principle. 
Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia were quick to criticize the Court’s 
inconsistent application of the history.350 Justice Scalia rightly observed that 
one of the primary functions of petitioning was the resolution of private 
concerns.351 As his concurrence described, the “overwhelming majority of First 
Congress petitions presented private claims.”352 Not only did the protections of 
the Petition and Free Speech Clauses reside in separate texts in the 
Constitution, the clauses also served wholly different values.353 Justice Scalia 
agreed that the Court would require a limiting principle, but he disagreed that 
transplanting the public-private distinction at the core of the First 
Amendment’s marketplace-of-ideas values made any sense in the context of 
other constitutional protections.354 It would likewise make little sense to say 
that the exercise of religion in public ought to be a matter of greater 
constitutional concern than practicing privately or to value due process 
concerns for public interest litigation over cases adjudicating private 
matters.355 Because the rights themselves are wholly different, the public 
concern at the core of the Free Speech Clause simply has no place in the 
context of the Petition Clause.356 
Drawing heavily on the history, Justice Scalia offered instead two other 
possible limiting principles, each of which bears particular mention here. First, 
he questioned the Court’s presumption that it had earlier held public employee 
grievances and lawsuits to be petitions subject to protection under the Petition 
 
348. Id.  
349. See id.  
350. Id. at 2501 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
351. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
352. Id. at 2504 (quoting 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 138, at xviii). 
353. Id. at 2504-05. 
354. Id. at 2506. 
355. Id. at 2505. 
356. Id. 
 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause 
68 STAN. L. REV. 1131 (2016) 
1181 
Clause.357 The Court’s doctrine establishing lawsuits as “petitions” rested on as 
shaky ground as the lobbying doctrine; much of it was dicta or ambiguous 
statutory interpretation with related Petition Clause concerns.358 Moreover, 
looking to the history, Justice Scalia found little direct evidence that the 
petition process ever engaged with courts.359 If neither Guarnieri’s grievance 
nor his lawsuit obtained Petition Clause protection, Justice Scalia reasoned, 
then there could be no corresponding suit for retaliation and the suit was 
clearly limited.360 Alternatively, assuming that the Petition Clause protected 
lawsuits and grievances, Justice Scalia offered a second alternative limiting 
principle: the Petition Clause would protect only petitions brought against the 
government as a sovereign by citizens, rather than filings brought against the 
government as an employer.361 As Justice Scalia admitted, such a rule would 
undoubtedly involve some level of ambiguity in application; but it would, at 
the very least, provide a limiting principle with greater relevance to the 
underlying right than the Free Speech Clause’s public-private speech 
distinction.362 
So in Guarnieri, the Court began the difficult process of exhuming distinct 
Petition and Free Speech Clauses from the Constitution and wrestling with the 
implications of that history for the petition right in the context of executive 
and judicial petitioning. The Court was receptive to the history and relied on it 
to clarify its doctrine, but pragmatic concerns brought about by earlier 
decisions and the parties’ own concessions—the parties had litigated the case on 
the assumption that the grievance and lawsuit were petitions363—dampened 
the Court’s reformist spirit. 
The Court has yet to address this history in the context of legislative 
petitioning or lobbying, and courts have begun to speculate that the history 
could have important effects on the doctrine.364 Because access to legislatures 
was of particular concern to the right to petition and because the doctrine 
around legislative petitioning is less developed, legislative petitioning and 
lobbying could provide a ripe area for a future Court to develop an 
independent Petition Clause doctrine. The following sections explore the 
implications of this contextualized interpretation for the petition right as 
applied to legislative advocacy and lobbying. 
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III. Implications for the Doctrine 
A. Contours of a Contextualized Right to Petition 
The contours of the right to petition might appear less anomalous if one 
recalls that the right predated the invention of American elections by hundreds 
of years. Unlike the Free Speech Clause, a text often described as having 
electoral concerns at its core,365 the Petition Clause protected a form of 
engagement with government wholly distinct from the majoritarian 
mechanism of the vote. Although lost to our understanding of constitutional 
law today,366 the historical distinction between civil rights and political rights 
provides a helpful frame to begin to establish the right to petition as more than 
mere extension of the franchise. Courts in nineteenth-century America 
recognized a distinction between “civil rights”—or the rights afforded all 
inhabitants of the United States, regardless of station or demographic—and 
“political rights,” or the rights afforded elites in society to allow for 
participation in the political process.367 The latter category included the rights 
to vote, to hold public office, and to serve on juries, while the former included a 
broad range of rights and freedoms, including the freedom of speech, freedom 
to worship, the right to contract, the right to hold property, and the right to 
sue and be sued.368 The distinction between civil and political rights was used 
as a means to justify and explain the extension of these rights to some classes of 
individuals and not others.369 To nineteenth-century Americans, it was not the 
case that white male landholders held all of the rights and that others held none 
but rather that different classes of individuals held different sets of rights.370 
Although women, free African Americans, Native Americans, and the foreign 
born suffered extensive injustice and subjugation during this period and 
beyond, these groups were in some instances at least nominally extended the 
same civil rights as others. These demographics did exercise property and 
 
365. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 27 (1948); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 477, 482 (2011); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and 
the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1823 (1999). 
366. See Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights1: The Future of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1208-10 (1992); see also G. Edward White, The 
Origins of Civil Rights in America, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 755, 758 (2014).  
367. Tushnet, supra note 366, at 1208. 
368. Id. at 1208-09, 1210 n.17, 1217. 
369. See id. at 1208-11 (describing civil rights as attached to all people qua people and 
political rights as reserved to those people designated by a structured political system). 
370. See id. at 1208-10; see also Ahkil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1131, 1164 (1991).  
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contract rights, as well as bring suits in court.371 White male landholders, on 
the other hand, enjoyed civil rights as well as the political power of the 
franchise.372 
Historically, the right to petition afforded not a political right but a “civil” 
right and was open to all inhabitants equally.373 Exercise of the right was not 
limited to the elite but was afforded to the politically powerful and powerless 
alike.374 Jury service, voting, and holding elected office all involved 
majoritarian decisionmaking and hewed closely to the structure and function 
of the political process. By contrast, petitioning constituted more than a mere 
extension of these political rights. Like other civil rights, the right to petition 
afforded individuals the ability to engage with government even in the absence 
of the franchise and without the consideration of political power generally at 
issue in the electoral process. 
In addition to functioning as a civil right, the right to petition was also an 
individual right. Some scholars, including Akhil Amar, have argued that the 
text and structure of the Petition Clause reveal a particularly majoritarian 
core.375 By contrast, the Court has recently taken the position that the right to 
petition is an individual right and not a “collective” or majoritarian right.376 
This divergence between the Court and the scholarly literature is likely due to 
the Court’s conclusion that the Petition Clause is wholly distinct from the 
Assembly Clause that precedes it.377 Other readings of the First Amendment, 
Amar’s included, lean heavily on the collective language of the Assembly 
Clause in articulating the collective and majoritarian nature of the right to 
petition.378 In addition to conjoining assembly and petition, Amar reads “the 
people” of the First Amendment as an invocation of popular sovereignty and 
an echo of the Founding-era calls for convention. Although the text and 
structure of the Petition Clause might support Amar’s interpretation, the 
historical record largely supports the minority and individual view. While the 
petition process served as a vehicle for social organization and mobilization of 
many marginalized groups,379 the petition right was in the main a tool for 
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individuals and minorities.380 The phrase “the people” in what became the First 
Amendment largely echoed the broad language of state constitutions, which 
provided the right broadly to all “people.” Moreover, as Amar has recognized 
elsewhere, the drafters of the First Amendment rejected the right of 
instruction, or the ability to bind lawmakers to majority will, describing 
petitioning as a process distinct from instruction.381 Rather, the right 
contained a strong quasi-adjudicative component and often served as a stopgap 
measure to remedy injuries for which no clear cause of action existed.382 
Legislatures were able to resolve by statute what courts did not have the ability 
to resolve through existing law, and litigants often converted complaints into 
petitions in order to receive redress.383 In this way, as well as others, the 
historical petition right served as a platform for minority voice in the 
lawmaking process. 
What the history of petitioning reveals is that the right to petition has 
more in common with the right to procedural due process than it does with 
free speech.384 The historical right to petition also provided a much more 
comprehensive and robust petition right than is recognized today. Similar to 
the due process right that governs judicial conduct, the petition right governed 
congressional procedure. The right was limited, however, to procedural 
protections only; nowhere did it guarantee a favorable policy outcome or 
secure substantive rights. The petition right preserved only the procedures of 
 
women’s political participation in advocacy campaigns against slavery and later for 
suffrage). 
380. See supra Part I.A. 
381. Amar, supra note 370, at 1154-56. 
382. See supra Part I.A. 
383. Higginson, supra note 34, at 145. 
384. Jerry Mashaw’s dignitary due process theory in the context of administrative 
adjudication provides a helpful overview of the general values implicated by 
procedural due process, including the “appearance of fairness”; “equality”; and 
“predictability, transparency and rationality.” See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 
455, 482-91 (1986) (reviewing Mashaw’s dignitary due process theory as a framework 
for noninstrumental values underlying the due process right). Recent work has drawn 
these values into the political realm to argue for proceduralism as a normative defense 
of democracy writ large. See, e.g., Maria Paula Saffon & Nadia Urbinati, Procedural 
Democracy, the Bulwark of Equal Liberty, 41 POL. THEORY 441, 443-45 (2013). Maria Paula 
Saffon and Nadia Urbinati, building on early twentieth-century theorists Hans Kelsen 
and Norberto Bobbio, propose democracy as the best protection for equality and 
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majority lawmaking but also mechanisms of participation for the minority in the 
lawmaking process. Id. at 459-60. Petitioning would provide one such mechanism.  
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acceptance, consideration, and response385 for each petition without respect to 
the political power of the petitioner.386 The petition right also shared the 
principles of transparency that underlie the due process right. In compliance 
with Article I’s Journal Clause,387 the process of consideration for each petition 
was by default a public process, and members read each petition aloud on the 
floor; included actions on petitions in the congressional record; and provided 
petitioners with formal, written responses.388 The right was also guaranteed. If 
Congress had jurisdiction to act on a petition and the petition was properly 
filed, then it afforded that petition formal process.389 The process afforded each 
petition was provided according to the merits of each petition and not 
according to the political power of the petitioner. Also, as directed by the Rules 
Clause of Article I,390 Congress established formal rules that governed the 
consideration of petitions and published those rules in the formal procedural 
manuals for each house.391 
However, the historical right to petition protected a substantially 
narrower right than that recognized by the Court today. In particular, the 
historical right concerned direct engagement with government only. The right 
to petition, unlike the right of free speech, concerned legislative advocacy 
directed toward government and solely through specific, formal channels. Any 
broader advocacy, even advocacy directed ultimately at legislative reform 
through electoral action or otherwise, that utilized channels outside those 
 
385. Stephen Higginson has argued persuasively that the colonists’ outrage over the British 
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386. See supra Part I.A. 
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established by government—including speech directed at the public 
marketplace, newspaper articles, pamphlets, and even protest—would likely 
fall outside of the Petition Clause’s protections. This is not to say that such 
action would fail to obtain any constitutional protections whatsoever. As core 
political speech, these actions would likely implicate the Free Speech Clause, 
and it is entirely likely that the Free Speech Clause would have provided a 
more appropriate framework to analyze earlier Petition Clause challenges. 
However, the relationship between the speech and petition rights, especially 
when the two come into conflict, is in need of future scholarly attention. Much 
of the Petition Clause doctrine to date has assumed these rights to be 
coextensive, largely because the Court has often referred to them 
interchangeably, without any real analysis of how the two rights can and 
should interact.392 
B. Implications for the Doctrine 
The historical petition right could begin to provide a strengthened, but 
narrowed, framework to structure future Petition Clause analysis. The impact 
that a contextualized right to petition could have on our Petition Clause 
doctrine is twofold: unsettling393 and unbundling. 
 
392. See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2491-92 (2011). Once the Court 
begins to address this question head on, it could have drastic implications for the 
doctrine. The relationship between free speech rights and other equivalent rights, like 
due process for court proceedings, is complicated, and free speech rights are often seen 
as wholly curtailed by the demands of competing rights. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884, 889-90 (2009) (developing a distinctive doctrine for 
campaign finance in the context of judicial elections because of the procedural due 
process concerns at issue in courts); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1070-71 
(1991) (noting that attorneys’ free speech rights inside and outside of court are properly 
circumscribed by ethical restrictions that preserve the integrity of judicial functions); 
see also Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession1: Constraints on Lawyers’ 
First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1998). 
393. Unsettling, as I use the term here, is not equivalent to “unsettlement theory” as 
developed by Louis Seidman to describe the Court’s role in “unsettl[ing]” wins and 
losses during the political process. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED 
CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2001). 
There have been no real wins or losses through the political process here because 
taken-for-granted assumptions have likely preempted the question. Rather, unsettling 
here refers to an attempt to suspend and interrogate the doxa, “the world of tradition 
experienced as a ‘natural world’ and taken for granted.” PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF 
A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164 (Richard Nice trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977) (1972). 
Unsettling here means the constitution of a “field of opinion” or a “critique which 
brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation.” Id. at 168. 
Unsettling is important because “[t]he political function of classifications is never more 
likely to pass unnoticed than in the case of relatively undifferentiated social 
formations, in which the prevailing classificatory system encounters no rival or 
antagonistic principle.” Id. at 164. 
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An important contribution of a clarified petition right would be to 
unsettle the presumption that the Supreme Court has held definitively that the 
Petition Clause protects all forms of lobbying. This presumption has led to 
confusion in the doctrine and a lack of reflection in application of the First 
Amendment and has frustrated efforts to regulate lobbying.394 Many courts 
now simply assume without analysis that petitioning and lobbying are 
synonymous.395 In a fairly recent example, the D.C. Circuit struck down a 
Department of Commerce regulation, promulgated in response to an Obama 
Administration presidential memorandum, banning registered lobbyists from 
serving on certain advisory commissions on the ground that it was an 
unconstitutional condition on the lobbyists’ Petition Clause rights.396 In 
support of the court’s presumption that lobbying was protected under the 
Petition Clause, Judge Tatel, writing for the court, cited to a single 1968 D.C. 
Circuit opinion that implicated the Petition Clause only tangentially.397 
Rather, the 1968 opinion addressed whether the freedom of speech protected 
the right of a newspaper to publish documents stolen from a lobbying firm by 
one of the firm’s employees.398 The two-page opinion referenced the Petition 
Clause only once, when discussing whether the stolen documents would 
implicate the public interest.399 In dicta, the opinion presumed, without 
analysis or support, that any lobbyist attempting to persuade Congress, 
presumably by any means, exercises her right to petition and, therefore, the 
exercise of that right must also fall into the public interest.400 In drafting Autor, 
the D.C. Circuit relied on dicta from that single 1968 opinion, strengthened no 
doubt by the Obama Administration’s concession that lobbying is protected by 
the Petition Clause, to strike down the ban. Given the nearly ubiquitous 
presumption that lobbying must be protected under the Petition Clause,401 the 
decision prompted little outcry. The Obama Administration declined to 
petition for certiorari and, instead, quickly amended its policies on lobbyist 
public service. Contrary to the government’s concession in Autor, the Supreme 
Court has yet to resolve the issue of whether the Petition Clause protects 
lobbying. Both a closer examination of the current doctrine and recognition of 
the history could begin to highlight the lack of foundation to this assumption. 
Second, a contextualized petition right would force an unbundling of the 
activities we currently conflate into the term “lobbying.” A close interrogation 
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reveals that lobbying is not one single practice but an amalgam of a broad 
range of advocacy practices, some triggering more constitutional concern than 
others.402 The conflation of these advocacy practices into a single term has led 
some scholars to suggest that “lobbying” ought to obtain strengthened First 
Amendment protection or, at the very least, protection under a First 
Amendment “penumbra” because a “bundle” of practices necessarily implicates 
a “bundle” of First Amendment protections. Unbundling “lobbying” into a clear 
articulation of what advocacy practice is at issue in a particular case could 
bring much-needed clarity to our scholarship and doctrine. 
In particular, unbundling could begin to clarify important distinctions 
between speech, petitioning, and lobbying. Cases like Noerr, which addressed 
the constitutional protections of a lobbying campaign directed at the public 
through speeches and the press,403 would fall under the Free Speech Clause, 
rather than the Petition Clause. Given that the Court has already conflated the 
speech and petition doctrines in these areas, the substantive impact of 
converting these to free speech cases, including the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
would be negligible. Clarity in the doctrine could, however, allow the Court to 
develop an independent framework specific to the particular needs and 
functions of the petition right. Second, a contextualized petition right could 
provide enough structure to support an independent Petition Clause doctrine. 
As in Guarnieri, the Court has often reflected on history in developing its First 
Amendment jurisprudence and the broader concerns structuring its free speech 
analysis often source from this historical reflection.404 A contextualized 
petition right could provide structure and a limiting principle to the doctrine 
and, most importantly, prevent the Court from again conflating petitioning 
with speech. Moreover, as noted, a distinct Petition Clause doctrine would 
provide the analytic space to articulate the relationship between the Petition 
and Free Speech Clauses, no longer assuming they are coextensive simply 
because of prior doctrinal conflation. 
Although complete analysis of the implications of a contextualized 
petition right for our current doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article, the 
balance of this Subpart will provide a few examples as illustrations of how the 
right could impact past and future issues in our lobbying and petitioning 
doctrine. Part III.B.1 looks backward to explain a longstanding puzzle at the 
 
402. To provide some examples: “lobbying” that consists of public-directed advocacy during 
an election, even aimed at influencing legislative outcomes, would fall into the heart of 
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heart of lobbying law that the historical petition right might resolve.  
Part III.B.2 describes issues looming on the horizon for our lobbying doctrine, 
identified in recent election law scholarship, which a contextualized petition 
right could avoid. The following Part, Part IV below, looks beyond the current 
doctrine to analyze the constitutionality of our current lobbying system under 
a contextualized petition right. 
1. Making sense of contingency fee contracts 
The core of lobbying law has long held a puzzle that a contextualized 
petition right could resolve. For the past seventy years, the Court has raised the 
possibility of First Amendment concerns when faced with the slightest 
restriction on lobbying activity. Belying these constitutional considerations, 
for much of this nation’s history, legislatures and courts have criminalized 
lobbying and voided lobbying contracts as against public policy without 
mention of the First Amendment. Zephyr Teachout recently crafted a careful 
and thoughtful review of this history, concluding that the distinction between 
earlier cases treating lobbying as a criminal act and later cases invoking First 
Amendment protections was rooted in a shift in both contract and 
constitutional law from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries.405 As Teachout 
describes, the turn of the twentieth century brought a shift in the courts’ usage 
of contract enforcement as a means to legislate in preservation of public 
policy.406 In the early 1900s, criminal law, specifically bribery charges, became 
the primary tool for courts to confront the corruption concerns raised by 
lobbying contingency fee contracts.407 It was this shift in doctrine, Teachout 
argues, that explains the difference in treatment of lobbying from the earlier 
contract cases to the Petition Clause cases like Harriss.408 
The history of petitioning provides an alternative, simplified solution to 
the apparent tension in the lobbying doctrine. The right to petition, as it was 
exercised in Harriss, protects formal engagement with government. The right 
does not protect, however, efforts to circumvent and undermine that formal 
process by engagement with Congress through informal means.409 Contracts 
struck down by the courts include services such as “procuring legislative  
action . . .by personal solicitation,” the sale of “personal influence to obtain the 
passage of a private law,” and an agreement that a lobbyist would “use his 
influence to ensure the passage of a law.”410 A court would just as likely void a 
 
405. Teachout, supra note 3, at 6. 
406. Id. at 17-19. 
407. Id. at 17. 
408. Id. at 17-19. 
409. Id. at 19. 
410. Id. at 7, 8, 10. 
 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause 
68 STAN L. REV. 1131 (2016) 
1190 
contract between a lawyer and a client for litigation services that included 
intentionally violating the established rules of civil procedure and using 
personal relationships to secure additional access to the judge to discuss the 
case, as it would void a contract for similar services in the context of Congress. 
In striking down contracts for lobbying services, the courts were explicit, 
however, that contracts for services in circumvention of the formal petition 
process by engaging with Congress through informal means were voidable, 
while contracts for representation during the formal petition and legislative 
process were not.411 The courts made clear that the latter contracts would not 
be against public policy and might even obtain constitutional protection.412 
While Teachout’s explanation for the tension in the doctrine could hold 
true, the contextualized petition right provides a simpler explanation: the 
Petition Clause protects only that conduct in comportment with the formal 
process and not efforts to engage informally with Congress. Contracts for 
services that circumvent the petition process would not obtain constitutional 
protection. 
2. Lobbying is not the new campaign finance 
Finally, an increasing number of scholars, primarily from the election law 
community, have begun to speculate that the Court’s steady dismantling of the 
campaign finance regulatory framework under the Free Speech Clause 
doctrine of Buckley v. Valeo413 and especially its progeny, Citizens United v. 
FEC,414 raises strong concerns about the constitutionality of any lobbying 
regulation, including our current disclosure regimes. 
Elizabeth Garrett, Ronald Levin, and Theodore Ruger first raised the issue 
in their chapter in the lobbying bible, The Lobbying Manual.415 As they describe 
it, the foundational regulatory scheme governing lobbyists, the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act, “is primarily justified on the ground that it combats political 
corruption,” and, therefore, the disclosure provisions that compelled lobbyists 
to share data on quarterly expenditures could run afoul of the Buckley doctrine 
if not narrowly tailored enough to address quid pro quo corruption.416 In 
particular, Garrett, Levin, and Ruger took issue with the fact that the lobbying 
expenditure disclosure requirements did not require disclosure of enough 
information, including more detailed information tying expenditures to 
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specific lawmaker targets, which they argue would more closely target 
disclosure of a quid pro quo relationship.417 The absence of a clear tie between 
the disclosure requirements and the ability to discern a quid pro quo 
relationship left the regime on a shaky foundation under the Buckley doctrine, 
assuming a corruption-based state interest.418 
Following the Citizens United decision in 2010 and its constriction of the 
corruption state interest, Rick Hasen published a comprehensive treatment of 
lobbying law, declaring all future lobbying regulation under fire and offering a 
new state interest in “promoting national economic welfare” as a motivation 
for future regulation.419 If lobbying regulation had been on shaky footing 
before the Court issued Citizens United, Hasen declared that the lower courts 
would use the “[Supreme] Court’s new deregulatory campaign finance 
jurisprudence” to steadily dismantle all forms of lobbying regulation.420 
In support, Hasen provided two examples: First, the Second Circuit in 
Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield applied Citizens United to strike down a 
Connecticut law that banned campaign contributions from lobbyists, the 
lobbyists’ spouses, and the lobbyists’ dependent children to candidates for state 
office and banned lobbyists from soliciting contributions, or fundraising, on 
behalf of a candidate.421 Second, the Southern District of Ohio in Brinkman v. 
Budish applied Citizens United to strike down an Ohio revolving door ban that 
prohibited former state lawmakers and their staff from appearing before the 
state legislature as lobbyists for a year after leaving public service.422 To Hasen, 
these decisions marked the rising tide of challenges that lobbying regulation 
faced after Citizens United.423 
Hasen’s article also followed on the heels of a number of election law 
scholars, most prominently Richard Briffault and Heather Gerken, who 
declared lobbying to be the “new campaign finance” and called for increased 
attention to the topic in the burgeoning field of election law.424 This 
declaration was not simply the reformer’s spirit looking for a more fruitful 
avenue of reform. Gerken described the two as inseparable, both factually and 
theoretically: 
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Money is just a visible symptom of the hydraulics of political influence. If we 
think about campaign finance in these terms, it is hard to imagine why anyone 
would neglect lobbying. It is the other natural means of seeking political 
influence. As long as lobbying and campaign finance work in tandem with one 
another, we should not study one without studying the other. Both are simply 
different means to achieve the same set of political ends. They are not isolated 
systems that are separate from one another.425 
Briffault shared Gerken’s perspective that lobbying and campaign finance 
were largely similar in that they are both “vital to representative democracy,” 
involve information and communication, raise common concerns about 
unequal wealth and unequal influence in the political process, and inspire 
concerns over improper influence or corruption.426 Briffault, however, went 
on to develop some of the distinctions between lobbying and campaign finance, 
including noting some important differences in the role of political equality 
between the two practices: 
Political equality plays a far smaller role in lobbying regulation. . . . 
Operationally, it is difficult to imagine a set of rules that could give each adult 
resident citizen an equal say on every issue subject to lobbying without choking 
off lobbying itself. Capping the amounts an individual or group could spend 
either on hiring a lobbyist or on lobbying personally would cut directly into the 
amount of lobbying the individual or group could undertake.427 
Rather than claiming that egalitarianism held no place in the context of 
lobbying, Briffault called for a form of equality theory that comports with the 
specific concerns of the petition process.428 Unlike the equality of influence 
generally espoused by election law scholars in the context of elections and the 
value of “one person, one vote,” however, Briffault recognized that engaging 
with the lawmaking process demanded a different kind of equality—namely, a 
procedural equality, akin to equality of access to courts:  
All citizens have a formal equal right to seek to lobby their legislature, and all 
individuals, organizations, or interest groups affected by a legislative proposal 
should have an equal opportunity to present their case to the legislature. . . . This, 
however, is not a matter of the political equality of individuals per se, but of 
structuring fair competition among contending interest groups.429 
Given the dearth of scholarship focused on lobbying and petitioning, the 
growing attention by the election law community to the issue of lobbying and 
lobbying regulation is most welcome. But as earlier parts describe, it is unclear 
whether the election law frames of the electoral process and the Free Speech 
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Clause, as well as the community’s ongoing debates over political equality430 
and political corruption,431 are appropriate for the particularities of the law of 
lobbying. Our current lobbying system is no doubt entrenched deeply in our 
system of campaign finance. As Briffault recognized, however, the important 
questions and concerns in the context of petitioning during the lawmaking 
process are different from and often in tension with the concerns of elections 
and campaign finance.432 Most notably, the electoral process serves as a 
mechanism of representation that aims to capture the will of the majority, 
while the petition process provides a counterpoint mechanism of 
representation for minorities and individuals to engage in the lawmaking 
process. 
The history of petitioning and the specific text of the Petition Clause 
counsel against conflation of the electoral and the legislative processes. These 
two contexts present wholly different dynamics. Elections rely on a 
majoritarian decision rule to select the composition of Congress, a rule 
necessarily dependent upon equality of influence, and involve political speech 
that falls into the core of the Free Speech Clause and its “marketplace of ideas” 
model. By contrast, the mechanism of petitioning rejected a majoritarian 
decision rule and instead established a platform for engagement during the 
lawmaking process, like that of a court, to give voice to individual and 
minority grievances. Unlike speech in the context of elections, petitioning is 
not directed at influencing public discourse, electoral outcomes, or the 
 
430. Id. at 113-14. 
431. Id. at 108. One potential exception is the theory of institutional corruption developed 
by Lawrence Lessig. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: THE CORRUPTION OF EQUALITY 
AND THE STEPS TO END IT 238 (rev. ed. 2015). Unlike other theories of political 
corruption, Lessig’s institutional corruption focuses on systemic corruption, or ways 
in which intended mechanisms of representation are undermined or “corrupted” by 
competing mechanisms. Id. at 18. His paradigmatic example is that of the “green 
primary,” or a private market for campaign fundraising that decides which candidates 
are able to run in an election based on how much the campaigns can raise from the 
wealthy. Id. at 11-16. Citizens can still technically vote for the candidates selected by 
the green primary, but the structure of our electoral system is “corrupted” by this 
earlier process that makes our votes less functional. Id. Scholars of the First 
Amendment might recognize strong parallels between this instance of institutional 
corruption and that of Robert Post’s “electoral integrity.” See ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS 
DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 60 (2014); see also Doe v. 
Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 198 (2010) (recognizing the state interest of “electoral integrity” in 
the context of ballot initiatives). However, Lessig’s theory of institutional corruption 
sweeps more broadly than elections and could capture some of the dynamics of our 
lobbying system as well. Similar to the green primary that corrupts our intended 
electoral system, lobbying is an institutional corruption of the petition process 
envisioned by the Petition Clause.  
432. Briffault, supra note 424, at 109-10. 
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marketplace of ideas.433 Given these differences, conflation of the mechanism 
of the vote and the mechanism of petitioning makes little sense and could 
undermine efforts to design and enact a system of public engagement with the 
lawmaking process that satisfies the particular countermajoritarian function 
that petitioning was intended to serve. 
This conflation also does not bode well for clarity in the doctrine. Without 
much reasoning or support, the lower courts have begun to assume that the 
Buckley doctrine applies to all lobbying regulation. Such an approach overlooks 
critical constitutional distinctions between regulation of the electoral process 
and regulation of the lawmaking process. Hasen highlights one poignant 
example in Brinkman v. Budish,434 where the Southern District of Ohio applied 
Citizens United to strike down an Ohio revolving door ban—a law that 
prevented former state lawmakers and their staff from petitioning the 
lawmaking process for one year after public service.435 Without reflection on 
the important distinctions between Brinkman and Green Party of Connecticut, 
Hasen relies on these two cases to declare a new era for all attempts to regulate 
lobbying post-Citizens United.436 While Hasen’s concern over judicial 
deregulation might ring true in the context of lobbyist participation in the 
campaign finance system—the area of regulation challenged in Green Party of 
Connecticut—the ban on petitioning challenged in Brinkman presents an 
entirely different question. 
Buckley and its progeny have developed as a doctrine specific to speech and, 
in particular, speech and the financing of speech in the context of electoral 
campaigns.437 This doctrine has clear application to a First Amendment 
challenge to the Connecticut campaign finance laws challenged in Green Party 
of Connecticut v. Garfield.438 By contrast, the ban on petitioning challenged in 
Brinkman holds no clear relationship to campaign finance or the electoral 
process whatsoever.439 While Citizens United included some loose language 
 
433. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011) (“The right to petition 
allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and 
their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of 
ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas 
and human affairs.”).  
434. Hasen, supra note 3, at 196; see also Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (S.D. 
Ohio 2010). 
435. Hasen, supra note 3, at 196. 
436. Id. at 195-96. 
437. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that provisions limiting 
the amount which any individual could spend independent of a particular candidate 
impermissibly abridged freedom of speech); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 
(2010) (holding that the government may not, under the First Amendment, suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity). 
438. 616 F.3d 213, 245 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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regarding lobbying law,440 nothing in that case dealt with lobbying regulation, 
petitioning, or the Petition Clause. Rather than ushering in a new era for all 
lobbying regulation, it is likely that Brinkman was simply an outlier case that 
wrongly applied a free speech doctrine to a Petition Clause case. 
The application of Buckley and its progeny to regulation of the petition 
process is likely a mistake of the ligation process. As Garrett, Levin, and Ruger 
observed, as campaign finance and lobbying have become all the more 
entwined, most governments describe their lobbying regulations as motivated 
by an interest in preventing corruption. When asked by the Southern District 
of Ohio in Brinkman why it had passed its lobbying ban, the Ohio government 
proffered that it had passed the law to prevent corruption and the appearance 
of corruption. Among other corruption concerns, Ohio wanted to prevent the 
corruption that would occur from former legislators “using their close 
relationships with former colleagues and special knowledge of the legislative 
process to gain access as lobbyists in ways that provide them unequal access to 
public officials [in comparison] to that of others petitioning the 
government.”441 In interpreting whether Ohio had met the proper standard to 
prove the corruption state interest, the court turned to the Buckley doctrine—
specifically Citizens United—the only doctrine that defines the corruption state 
interest.442 In determining whether unequal access to lawmakers during the 
lawmaking process would constitute corruption, the court responded that 
under Citizens United, a case that noted explicitly that unequal access was not 
corruption, it would not.443 Not only does conflation of campaign finance and 
lobbying in the election law scholarship risk missing the theoretical nuances 
specific to petitioning, it risks a similar dismantling of lobbying regulation 
under the Free Speech Clause as that fated to campaign finance reform. 
IV. Contextualizing Our Current Lobbying System 
A. Our Current Lobbying System 
Although lobbying and money in politics are increasingly vilified for 
“corrupting” our political process, little empirical evidence exists to support 
 
440. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369. 
441. Brinkman, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (alteration in original). 
442. Id. 
443. Id. It also bears noting that, even if a litigant should raise a challenge to regulation of 
the petition process under Buckley, the Court could always hold the doctrine inapposite 
on other grounds. Specifically, regulation of the petition process is better suited to the 
campaign finance doctrine developed for the judiciary, in the context of due process 
rights, and distinguished explicitly from Buckley in Citizens United. See Citizens United, 
588 U.S. at 360. 
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the conclusion that undue influence causes lawmakers to shift their votes.444 
Despite the best efforts of generations of political scientists, empirical studies of 
Congress have found only indeterminate evidence that campaign 
contributions and political power lead to more favorable policy outcomes. The 
few studies that have focused on lobbying exclusively have reached similar 
conclusions, finding little correlation between positive substantive outcomes 
and lobbying expenditures.445 The steady influx of millions of dollars in 
campaign contributions and billions of dollars expended on lobbying reminds 
empiricists, however, that rational political donors continue to find a reason to 
invest in lobbying and campaign contributions. As a consequence, despite years 
of dissatisfying findings, political scientists continue to try to find an empirical 
connection between resources and influence on outcomes. This struggle has 
only intensified in the years following Buckley v. Valeo and the Court’s use of 
the doctrine to steadily dismantle Congress’s ability to regulate the political 
process and to narrow “undue influence” to quid pro quo transactions. 
By contrast, it has been settled for decades that Congress affords greater 
consideration and access to the lawmaking process to those who have provided 
campaign contributions and to the politically powerful. Political theorists have 
long speculated that contributions and political power bought access in 
Congress.446 But starting in the 1980s, empiricists dissatisfied with the inability 
to find a correlation between political money and roll call votes turned their 
methods to study other measures of influence on the lawmaking process.447 
Using survey data that charted time usage by a random sample of members of 
the House from the ninety-fifth Congress combined with FEC data on 
campaign contributions, Laura Langbein found that PAC contributions 
significantly increased the likelihood that an interest group would gain access 
to a lawmaker with the “cost” of lawmaker time ranging from $6400 for less 
than twenty-five minutes to $72,300 for an hour with a lawmaker.448 A few 
years later, Richard Hall and Frank Wayman used interviews and markup 
records to study the relationship between PAC contributions and the allocation 
 
444. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 105, 116 (2003). 
445. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, 
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446. J. David Gopoian, What Makes PACs Tick?1: An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of 
Economic Interest Groups, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259, 262 (1984); James F. Herndon, Access, 
Record, and Competition as Influences on Interest Group Contributions to Congressional 
Campaigns, 44 J. POL. 996, 997 (1982); Alexander Heard, Money and Politics 14-15 
(Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 242, 1956). 
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of access and attention to an issue in three congressional committees.449 Hall 
and Wayman found a strong correlation between campaign contributions to 
members already ideologically aligned with an issue and increased access to 
those members and increased attention by those members to the donor’s 
issue.450 
More recent studies have confirmed earlier results. A randomized field 
experiment of 191 congressional offices revealed that senior policymakers 
made themselves available for a meeting three-to-four times more often if the 
person trying to schedule the meeting was an identified campaign 
contributor.451 The presumption that access to lawmakers is contingent on a 
relationship with that member, built through campaign contributions and 
other forms of electoral power, has become profoundly uncontroversial. 
Taking the correlation between access and political power as given, political 
scientists have now started to focus on analyzing stratification within 
politically powerful groups. They are finding even further entrenchment of 
who gains access to lawmakers as the costs of building relationships with 
members increase over time.452 Unlike campaign contributions affecting 
policy outcomes, the fact that Congress affords access and process unequally 
and based on political power has become settled doctrine in political science. 
It is perhaps even less controversial to claim that those who are able to 
muster the political capital to secure access to lawmakers are afforded wholly 
arbitrary, informal, and unequal process. As Langbein’s findings demonstrate, 
the amount of time spent with a lawmaker correlates closely with the political 
power of the individual securing the meeting, so the less politically powerful 
can expect far less time and, by inference, less process devoted to their issues as 
a result.453 The little process that petitioners can expect, if any, is incredibly 
informal, and no standards exist to provide minimum requirements or ethical 
guidelines.454 
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By contrast to our historical petition process, which was governed by 
formal rules, public process, and nonarbitrary consideration, our current 
lobbying system consists entirely of informal and opaque norms, customs, and 
practices. An individual who wants to engage with the lawmaking process in 
Congress could obtain a meeting with a member or her staff at which the 
individual could deliver her “one-pager,” a customary lobbying document that 
outlines the policy issue, and her “ask,” a request for specific legislative 
action.455 But she could also receive no response to her request to meet—instead 
she might have to meet with a member at a fundraiser for the member’s 
campaign and deliver her “one-pager” and her “ask” along with her 
contribution of $1000 for individuals or $2500 for a PAC. 
When it comes to our lobbying system of today, no procedure is 
guaranteed and there are no clear rules. Contrary to historical congressional 
practice, neither chamber drafts parliamentary rules outlining the procedures 
of our current lobbying system. Unlike court process, the default expectation is 
that contact with the legislature will be shielded from public view, and no 
public record exists to provide the due process protections that public scrutiny 
affords. The informality and opacity of the lobbying system has essentially 
closed the process to nonprofessionals and noninsiders.456 No government 
websites document the process by which individuals may lobby Congress or 
describe the formalities of lobbying consideration. The few texts to describe 
the process are confined to manuals for professional lobbyists and describe an 
entirely informal system of customs and norms.457 Unlike the rules of civil 
procedure and other due process requirements, few laws govern the means by 
which the public engages with Congress, and those that do tend to articulate 
only the boundaries of the process through ethics rules, lobbying restrictions, 
and criminal bribery laws.458 No formal structure exists to ensure that our 
current lobbying system comports with the petition right. 
B. Implications of the Petition Right for Our Lobbying System 
As empirical work in political science demonstrates, Congress has 
developed through our current lobbying system an informal petitioning 
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mechanism that is opaque and unorthodox and that provides preferential 
access to the lawmaking process to the politically powerful. Our current 
lobbying system has become mundane and routinized inside Congress as 
members engage daily with constituents, lobbyists, and other interested parties 
to gather information and hear grievances. Although Congress has not passed a 
statute that limits the right to petition, it has developed an extensive system of 
informal procedures that does just that. These informal procedures constitute 
what Francis Lieber termed the “common law” of Congress and what I term, 
borrowing from recent work by Victoria Nourse, ”legislative common law.”459 
Similar to the means by which the rules of civil procedure and laws of evidence 
constitute due process in courts, it is through the enactment of this legislative 
common law that Congress constitutes the petition process. 
By affording access to the lawmaking process unequally, conditioned on 
the political power of the petitioner, and on an arbitrary, informal, and opaque 
basis, Congress is violating the Petition Clause. Rather than establishing a 
mechanism for petitioning that comports with the right, Congress has 
essentially conflated the functions and principles of the electoral process into 
the lawmaking process. The electoral process, and the core principles of the 
speech right that protect it, functions to foster a free and competitive 
marketplace of ideas where the most popular ideas rise above the din, shape 
electoral conduct, and are then resolved through a majoritarian decision rule. 
Petitioning, by contrast, provided a mechanism for individuals and minorities 
to have a voice in the lawmaking process that more closely resembled the 
procedural due process right afforded litigants in court. The right was 
individual and protected certain procedural guarantees, including 
consideration and response. In conflating these two distinct mechanisms of 
representation, Congress has carried forward the majoritarian decision rule 
intended to resolve public decisionmaking during the electoral process into the 
distinctive process of petitioning. Put simply, our current lobbying system 
violates the right to petition. 
1. Remedies 
To resolve Congress’s current violation of the right to petition, I propose 
that Congress at minimum formalize the petition process and establish 
procedures whereby it would afford public and equal access to the lawmaking 
process. In many ways, such a system would resemble an Administrative 
Procedure Act460 for Congress. Establishing such a system would require more 
than our current lobbying registration and disclosure regime. In place of our 
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current Lobbying Disclosure Act,461 Congress should enact, either through 
rules or by statute, formal guidelines to make transparent and predictable the 
consideration it will afford. This proposed solution would not require any 
prohibitions or lobbying bans. Rather, Congress could regulate both the 
petition process and efforts to circumvent that process through “lobbying” by 
preempting the field and establishing comprehensive regulation that governs 
affirmatively when and how the public may engage with Congress.  
Ideally, this comprehensive system would resemble the petition process 
that served our legislatures well for over a hundred years and that the Framers 
protected with the Petition Clause. As described, this quasi-adjudicative process 
considered grievances submitted by petitioners as formal filings, which 
contained a statement of grievance, arguments in support of the grievance, 
signatures in support of the petition, and occasionally supplemental materials 
like proposed legislative language or other supportive evidence. By contrast to 
contemporary legislative practice, members would always know of the source 
of proposed statutory language and other materials introduced through the 
petition process. Members would read these petitions aloud on the floor of 
Congress and then refer the petition to the appropriate committee, executive 
agency, or adjudicative body.462 Whatever the substantive outcome, Congress 
would afford petitioners formal consideration of their petitions, and action on 
the petition would become part of the congressional record.463 As lobbying 
drives the congressional agenda today,464 Congress could allow petitions to 
drive the legislative agenda in place of our current lobbying system. In 
response to voluminous numbers of similar petitions, Congress could resolve 
the issue as it has historically by either consolidating the petitions or by 
creating new government institutions to process the petitions. In fact, 
Congress dealt with problems of volume historically by creating much of the 
administrative state and specialized courts, including the Patent and 
Trademark Office and the Court of Claims, for example. Congress could 
resolve frivolous petitions through summary dismissal. 
By establishing the petition process affirmatively, Congress could also 
clarify what constitutes improper procedure and access. Congress could then 
regulate engagement with Congress and lawmakers outside of the formalized 
petition process through disclosure and ethics rules, including recusal rules 
similar to those that govern judges. This is not to say that lawmakers could no 
longer engage with the public. A conversation at a town hall to clarify a 
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lawmaker’s policy position before an upcoming election could be ethical, and 
lawmakers could still reach out to the public for hearings and other formal 
processes. By contrast, listening to an individual grievance and accepting draft 
statutory language to resolve that grievance at a fundraiser could be subject to 
disclosure requirements, ethics restrictions, and recusal requirements. 
Lawmakers would be required to disclose those all-too-common text messages 
from powerful lobbyists that direct questions during hearings. To the extent 
that Congress found these and other circumventions too disruptive of the 
lawmaking process, Congress could begin to limit these circumventions. A 
formal petition process could also allow professionalization of the 
representatives who represent the public in the formal petition process. As we 
now regulate lawyers who represent their clients before formal government 
proceedings in courts and otherwise, we could begin to establish professional 
standards and ethics restrictions for those highly trained policy experts now 
employed as lobbyists. Not only would professionalization benefit the petition 
process and the client, but professional lobbyists might also welcome the 
heightened stature and improved public understanding of their now vilified 
profession. 
2. Objections 
First, adopting this proposed solution would inevitably face problems of 
scale. Some historians speculate that the formal petition process died out in 
Congress because lawmakers struggled to manage the sheer volume of petition 
submissions as the country grew.465 This theory suffers from some yet 
unexplored flaws, but the fact remains that today’s Congress represents a polity 
of over 320 million individuals and tackles a host of modern regulatory issues 
far more complex than in earlier centuries. Federal jurisdiction has also 
expanded and with it the range of possible matters on which petitioners might 
express grievances. These criticisms do not consider, however, that while 
formal petitioning in Congress may have fallen by the wayside, public 
engagement with Congress has not. In response to an industry that some 
speculate may exceed $8 billion in expenditures per year, Congress is 
necessarily spending resources and affording informal process to the public. 
Congress has established a de facto petition process and is attempting to address 
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scalability and complexity problems by establishing an informal, grey market 
system that affords preferential access and process to the politically powerful. 
There is no doubt that concerns over feasibility should inspire caution and 
further discussion on questions of institutional design, but problems of scale 
should not preclude reform of our lobbying system for two reasons. First, our 
government has confronted and resolved problems of scale in a number of 
other areas. For example, our extensive system of lower federal courts did not 
exist at the Founding but has scaled appropriately in response to increased 
federal jurisdiction and volume of litigants.466 Congress could summarily 
dispose of frivolous motions and could consolidate duplicative motions. In 
addition to simple expansion, the courts have also developed an extensive 
system of procedural rules to routinize and streamline the litigation process.467 
Our heavy reliance, for better or worse, on pretrial motion practice and the 
settlement process to dispose of actions has been a functional solution to 
problems of scale.468 Along similar lines, our administrative agencies have 
developed complex and large-scale means of public engagement through the 
formal notice-and-comment process. There is little that would prevent 
Congress from adopting these and other similar measures to respond to issues 
of scalability. Moreover, advances in technology in the twenty-first century 
offer additional solutions to problems of scale not available historically.469 
Second, and most importantly, issues of scale should not preclude future 
reforms because our current lobbying system is constitutionally inadequate. 
Preserving the status quo is simply not an option if Congress aims to comply 
with its obligations under the Petition Clause. 
A second objection is that this proposed solution could create tension 
between the Petition Clause and other First Amendment rights, most notably 
speech and association. On further reflection, however, this tension could 
actually prove beneficial. The upside to a fully articulated petition process is 
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that it would force the courts to begin to clarify the relationship between the 
Petition Clause and the Free Speech and Association Clauses, as it has done in 
other contexts. In confronting this tension elsewhere, the Supreme Court has 
routinely held that limitations on speech and associational rights do not violate 
the Constitution if those limitations protect government processes. To provide 
three poignant examples: The Court, per Justice Scalia, upheld a law which 
restricted the right to speak on the floor of a state legislature as a reasonable 
protection of the lawmaking process.470 Similarly, the Court has held that a 
restriction on ballot information was a reasonable regulation of the electoral 
process and did not violate a challenger’s speech and associational rights.471 
Kathleen Sullivan has meticulously documented the myriad restrictions on the 
ability of lawyers to speak in violation of court rules upheld as reasonable 
protections of the judicial process.472 If these other contexts are any indication, 
any Free Speech Clause protections for lobbying will give way to the right to 
petition when lobbying undermines the petition process. 
Finally, some might argue that a petition right analogous to a procedural 
due process right has no place in the majoritarian institution of Congress and 
that, as a so-called “political branch,” Congress should be more “democratic” 
than the courts. Under a simple model of democracy, the need to be responsive 
to majoritarian pressures throughout the lawmaking process could justify 
affording more access and consideration to those with political power. This 
presupposition, however, relies on two misconceptions. First, it ignores the 
key distinction that exists between the electoral process, governed by a 
majoritarian-decision rule,473 and the lawmaking process, which was designed 
 
470. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2347, 2351 (2011) (“Legislative 
sessions would become massive town-hall meetings if those who had a right to speak 
were not limited to [lawmakers] who had a right to vote. . . . This Court has rejected the 
notion that the First Amendment confers a right to use governmental mechanics to 
convey a message.”); see also Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 
782 F.3d 520, 531 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (delineating the distinctions between First 
Amendment rights in the electoral context and those in the lawmaking context). 
471. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 362-63 (1997) (“We are 
unpersuaded, however, by the party’s contention that it has a right to use the ballot 
itself to send a particularized message, to its candidate and to the voters, about the 
nature of its support for the candidate. Ballots serve primarily to elect candidates, not 
as forums for political expression.”). 
472. Kathleen M. Sullivan, supra note 392, at 569 (“Lawyers’ freedom of speech is 
constrained in many ways that no one would challenge seriously under the First 
Amendment. Rules of evidence and procedure, bans on revealing grand jury 
testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions for frivolous pleadings, to name a few, 
are examples of speech limitations that are widely accepted as functional necessities in 
the administration of justice, much like rules of order in a town meeting.”). 
473. This distinction tracks that drawn by Adrian Vermeule between majoritarianism writ 
large, or decisions made by an electoral mass to select partisan representatives “like 
bundles of issue-preferences,” and majoritarianism writ small, or “voting in a series of 
single-issue referendums.” Adrian Vermeule, The Force of Majority Rule, in MAJORITY 
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to be more complex than a simple majoritarian system.474 Conflation of the 
electoral and lawmaking processes ignores the long history of legislatures, 
including Congress, that provided formal, equal access to the lawmaking 
process for individuals and minorities through the petition process475 and the 
protection of that right through ratification of the Petition Clause.476 As 
discussed, the drafters of the Petition Clause considered and explicitly rejected 
the right to instruct representatives, whereby a majority could bind a 
lawmaker to its will.477 Debates around the Petition Clause described the right 
as one that was inherently individual and the petition process as a platform for 
individual voices in the lawmaking process.478 Second, we need to evaluate 
critically the foundations of our assumptions that legislatures are strictly 
majoritarian institutions and that the absence of majoritarian legislative 
outcomes undermines our Congress. A critical gaze might reveal the lack of 
any foundation at all to these assumptions. Rather, our Constitution 
established a republican form of government,479 and although that term is 
itself ambiguous, it is well settled that a republican form of government is not a 
direct democracy.480 
 
DECISIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 134-35 (Stephanie Novak & Jon Elster eds., 2014). 
One is a manner of selecting representatives only, without necessarily driving 
substantive outcomes and the procedures by which those substantive outcomes are 
reached. There is of course some relation between the two, but the relation has been 
highly disputed to date as a matter of political and moral theory. See also HANNA 
FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 1-13 (Univ. of Cal. Press 
paperback ed., 1972). 
474. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT 
SMALL 85-114 (2007) (listing “submajority” voting rules across a range of institutions, 
including Congress, and describing these mechanisms as a stable means of allowing 
minorities to “force a kind of public accountability upon the majorities who would 
otherwise prefer to sweep minority views and desires under the rug”). This Article 
frames petitioning as an additional structural right, akin to procedural due process, 
and a mechanism of minority protection. In so doing, it joins the growing body of 
scholarly discourse challenging the majoritarian-protecting structure and minority-
protecting rights distinction. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius1: The 
Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 594-95 (2015). 
475. See supra Part I.B. 
476. See supra Part II.B. 
477. See supra Part I.B. 
478. See supra Part III.A. 
479. See supra Part I.B. 
480. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (1James Madison), supra note 105, at 46-47 
(distinguishing a “pure” or direct democracy from the proposed republican or 
representative national government outlined in the Constitution).  
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Conclusion 
On one level, this is an article about lobbying and about the need for a 
paradigm shift in how we are approaching reform. This Article’s main focus of 
inquiry, however, is not simply lobbying but rather Congress, an institution 
much reviled by the public and largely ignored by the legal academy. Congress 
has, in some senses, fallen into an intellectual jurisdictional hole. On the one 
hand, political scientists find the lawmaking process too “legal” to involve their 
discipline and, on the other hand, legal scholars recoil at an institution they 
envision as devoid of law and driven by politics all the way down. Our neglect 
has likely contributed to the institution’s current dysfunction. It is time that we 
begin to see the lawmaking process as again the domain of lawyers and open a 
discussion as to the theory and law that should structure that process. 
In illuminating the history and theory behind the petition process and the 
Petition Clause, this Article takes an early step toward developing an 
affirmative vision of how Congress should function within our constitutional 
framework. In particular, this Article begins the work of articulating a 
concrete vision of how Congress should engage with the public outside of the 
vote. Historically, Congress engaged with the public through a formal, 
nonarbitrary, transparent, and equal process called petitioning. Because the 
petition process was designed to protect individuals and minorities, the process 
was not contingent on the political power of the petitioner. The 
unenfranchised engaged in petitioning, and lawmakers did not require a 
minimum signature count to obtain review and response. We often assume 
that legislatures and the lawmaking process are as majoritarian as the vote; 
history provides a more nuanced view. The Framers codified the right to 
petition in the First Amendment. To date, we have presupposed, often without 
support or reasoning, that the current way that Congress engages with the 
public—that is, our current lobbying system—is constitutionally protected by 
the right to petition. But a closer look reveals that our current lobbying 
system, which is informal, arbitrary, and opaque and which provides 
preferential treatment to the politically powerful, provides none of the values 
protected by the petition right. In failing to satisfy even the basic requirements 
of the petition right, Congress is violating our right to petition. 
At best, clarity in the right to petition and Congress’s obligation to the 
public under that right could motivate Congress toward reform. The 
legislative histories of earlier efforts at reform appear to turn on confusion 
over the scope of the Petition Clause. The more cynical among us, however, 
can at least hope that clarity in the petition right might stimulate the external 
pressure necessary, either by the public or the courts, to bring about much-
needed reform. 
 
 
